And now we come to explain with the help of the Blessed L–rd, yet another great principle in these things, by which the fifth condition will also be clarified for you. Know that the entire heter that we wrote about in section 1 obtains only if the man to whom he would reveal the story did not yet consummate the partnership with the other, but only agreed to do so. But if it were consummated (by each according to his circumstances, as explained by the poskim, in such a manner as to forbid their retraction thereafter), [the din] depends in this: if he [the prospective revealer] knows that by revealing what he knows about the man, the other would harm him in no way, but only guard himself so that from now on no harm would befall him, and all the conditions set down in section 2 were also met, then it would be proper to do so [i.e., to reveal it]. But if he knew the nature of the man to whom he would tell it, to be such that as soon as he heard it he would believe it implicitly (either because it is his nature to believe such things immediately of his neighbor, or because there are "indications" [pointing to the truth of the revelation], or because he relies on him [the teller] implicitly), and he would immediately rule for himself and take action, i.e., withdraw from his agreement or do him some other injury, then even if he would not do anything worse than the din that beth-din would pronounce if two witnesses testified in beth-din according to his [the revealer's] words, still, it is forbidden [to reveal it]. For by his revealing it he does harm to the man [he speaks about], as would not be the case even if he testified about him in beth-din. For even if he said the very same thing in beth-din, beth-din could not impose upon him monetary payment according to his testimony, his being a single witness, [whose testimony is not accepted.] And now [if he revealed it] he would cause him real harm by doing so. And, according to this, if the tellers of the thing were two, who themselves witnessed it, it would seem to be permitted [for them to reveal it]. For their intent is only to rescue the hearer from harm and also not to cause [the other], by their revelation, more than accords with the din. (For if they see that by revealing it he [the hearer] would cause the other harm, which even beth-din would not impose upon their testimony, they have no advantage over a single witness, and it certainly would be forbidden for them to reveal it.) And it is also necessary to insure that none of the other particulars mentioned above in section 2 are lacking.
וְעַתָּה נָבוֹא לְבָאֵר בְּעֶזְרַת ה' יִתְבָּרַךְ עוֹד עִקָּר גָּדוֹל בְּעִנְיָנִים אֵלּוּ, וְעַל יְדֵי זֶה יִתְבָּאֵר לְךָ גַּם כֵּן הַפְּרָט הַחֲמִישִׁי הַנַּ"ל. דַּע, דְּכָל עֶצֶם הַהֶתֵּר, שֶׁכָּתַבְנוּ בְּסָעִיף א', הַיְנוּ, דַּוְקָא אִם הָאִישׁ, שֶׁהוּא מְסַפֵּר לוֹ, לֹא גָּמַר עֲדַיִן הָעִנְיָן עִם (טו) הַשֶּׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ, רַק הִסְכִּימוּ בְּיַחַד לִגְמֹר אֶת הָעִנְיָן הַהוּא. אֲבָל אִם גָּמַר עִמּוֹ הָעִנְיָן, (כָּל אֶחָד לְפִי עִנְיָנוֹ הַמְבֹאָר בַּפּוֹסְקִים, בְּמַה שֶּׁנִּגְמַר דַּרְכֵי קִנְיָנָם, שֶׁיִּהְיוּ אֲסוּרִים לַחְזֹר מִזֶּה אַחַר כָּךְ), תָּלוּי בָּזֶה, (טז) אִם הוּא יוֹדֵע שֶׁמֵּחֲמַת דִּבּוּרוֹ, שֶׁיְּגַלֶּה לוֹ, לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה לַשֶּׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ שׁוּם הֶזֵּק, רַק שֶׁמֵּעַתָּה יִשְׁמֹר אֶת עַצְמוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא יָבוֹא לוֹ שׁוּם הֶזֵּק מִמֶּנּוּ, וְנִשְׁלְמוּ לָזֶה גַּם כֵּן הַפְּרָטִים הַמְבאָרִים לְעֵיל בְּסָעִיף ב', אֲזַי מֻתָּר וְנָכוֹן הַדָּבָר לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן. אֲבָל אִם הוּא מַכִּיר אֶת טֶבַע הָאִישׁ, שֶׁהוּא מְסַפֵּר לוֹ, שֶׁאִם יְגַלֶּה לוֹ אֶת הַדָּבָר, יַחְלִיטוֹ תֵּכֶף לְוַדַּאי גָּמוּר, (אוֹ מִשּׁוּם שֶׁטִּבְעוֹ לְהַאֲמִין תֵּכֶף רַע עַל חֲבֵרוֹ, אוֹ מִשּׁוּם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ עָלָיו דְּבָרִים הַנִּכָּרִים, אוֹ מִשּׁוּם שֶׁסוֹמֵךְ עָלָיו מְאֹד), וְיִפְסֹק תֵּכֶף הַדִּין לְעַצְמוֹ (יז) וְיַעֲשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה, דְּהַיְנוּ, לַחְזֹר מֵהַשֶּׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ, אוֹ שְׁאָר עִנְיְנֵי הֶזֵּק, עַל פִּי דִּבּוּרוֹ, אַף שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה גָּרוּעַ יוֹתֵר מֵעֵרֶךְ הַדִּין, שֶׁהָיָה יוֹצֵא בְּבֵית דִּין עַל פִּי דִּבּוּרוֹ, אִלּוּ הָיוּ שְׁנִי עֵדִים מְעִידִין כִּדְבָרָיו, אַף עַל פִּי כֵן אָסוּר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁבְּדִבּוּרוֹ הוּא גּוֹרֵם הֶזֵּק לַנִּדּוֹן, מַה שֶּׁלֹּא הָיָה יוֹצֵא עַל יְדֵי דְּבָרָיו, אֲפִלּוּ אִם הָיָה מֵעִיד עָלָיו בְּבֵית דִּין, כִּי אִלּוּ הָיָה אוֹמֵר עָלָיו עִנִיָן זֶה גּוּפָא בְּבֵית דִּין, לֹא הָיְתָה יְכֹלֶת בְּיַד בֵּית דִּין לְחַיֵּב אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן עַל יְדֵי דִּבּוּרוֹ, כִּי הוּא עֵד אֶחָד, וְעַתָּה הוּא גּוֹרֵם לַנִּדּוֹן הֶזֵּק מַמָּשׁ עַל יְדֵי דִּבּוּרוֹ. וּלְפִי זֶה, אִם הַמְסַפְּרִים אֶת הָעִנְיָן (יח) הֵם שְׁנַיִם, (יט) שֶׁהֵם רָאוּ בְּעַצְּמָם אֶת הָעִנְיָן, הָיָה נִרְאֶה לְהַתִּיר בְּעִנְיָן זֶה, (כ) שֶׁאֵין כַּוָּנָתָם בְּסִפּוּרָם, רַק לְסַלֵּק הַנְּזָקִים מִזֶּה, וְגַם שֶׁלֹּא יְסוּבַב עַל יְדֵי סִפּוּרָם יוֹתֵר מִכְּפִי הַדִּין, (דְּאִם הֵם רוֹאִין, שֶׁאִם יְגַלּוּ לוֹ אֶת הָעִנְיָן, יַעֲשֶׂה עִמּוֹ דָּבָר, שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ בֵּית דִּין לֹא הָיוּ עוֹשִׂין כֵּן עַל פִּי דִּבְרֵיהֶן, אֵין לָהֶם שׁוּם יִתְרוֹן מִמְּסַפֵּר יְחִידִי, וּבְוַדַּאי דְּאָסוּר לָהֶם לְסַפֵּר), וְגַם שֶׁלֹּא יַחְסְרוּ בָּזֶה שְׁאָר (כא) הַפְּרָטִים הַנַּ"ל בְּסָעִיף ב'.
And now we come to explain with the help of the Blessed L–rd, yet another great principle in these things, by which the fifth condition will also be clarified for you. Know that the entire heter that we wrote about in section 1 obtains only if the man to whom he would reveal the story did not yet consummate the partnership with the other, but only agreed to do so. But if it were consummated (by each according to his circumstances, as explained by the poskim, in such a manner as to forbid their retraction thereafter), [the din] depends in this: if he [the prospective revealer] knows that by revealing what he knows about the man, the other would harm him in no way, but only guard himself so that from now on no harm would befall him, and all the conditions set down in section 2 were also met, then it would be proper to do so [i.e., to reveal it]. But if he knew the nature of the man to whom he would tell it, to be such that as soon as he heard it he would believe it implicitly (either because it is his nature to believe such things immediately of his neighbor, or because there are "indications" [pointing to the truth of the revelation], or because he relies on him [the teller] implicitly), and he would immediately rule for himself and take action, i.e., withdraw from his agreement or do him some other injury, then even if he would not do anything worse than the din that beth-din would pronounce if two witnesses testified in beth-din according to his [the revealer's] words, still, it is forbidden [to reveal it]. For by his revealing it he does harm to the man [he speaks about], as would not be the case even if he testified about him in beth-din. For even if he said the very same thing in beth-din, beth-din could not impose upon him monetary payment according to his testimony, his being a single witness, [whose testimony is not accepted.] And now [if he revealed it] he would cause him real harm by doing so. And, according to this, if the tellers of the thing were two, who themselves witnessed it, it would seem to be permitted [for them to reveal it]. For their intent is only to rescue the hearer from harm and also not to cause [the other], by their revelation, more than accords with the din. (For if they see that by revealing it he [the hearer] would cause the other harm, which even beth-din would not impose upon their testimony, they have no advantage over a single witness, and it certainly would be forbidden for them to reveal it.) And it is also necessary to insure that none of the other particulars mentioned above in section 2 are lacking.