The commandment of testimony: To say the testimony in front of the judges, in all that we know of it — whether with the testimony, [the accused] will become liable for death or money that is earmarked for him, or whether it will be his salvation for his money or for his life — as it is stated (Leviticus 5:1), “and he is a witness or saw or knew, if he does not say, he will carry his iniquity.” In every matter, it is an obligation (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 1:1) upon us to say the testimony in front of the court (Bava Kamma 55b).
However there is a difference between monetary laws, and capital and other laws in the Torah. As with monetary laws, a man is not obligated to testify about them on his own, unless a party in the case or the court solicits him. But with capital laws and other prohibitions in the Torah — for example, he saw someone that transgressed a prohibition; and so [too,] with capital testimony, that he saw someone kill his fellow; or in the testimony of blows, that one hit his fellow — with all of this, a man is obligated to come on his own and say the testimony in front of a court, so as to destroy the evil and to separate a man from a prohibition.
It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] because there is great benefit to people with this commandment. It is not necessary to write at length about it, as the things are known to all who see the sun.
The laws of the commandment: For example, the differences that the Sages, may their memory be blessed, revealed to us that there are in this commandment between one man and another, such that not every man is obligated to come in front of the court to testify to them: For example, if the witness was a great sage and the court less than he, he may — if he wants — withhold from testifying in front of them; as the positive commandment of honor of the Torah pushes off the positive commandment of testimony (as is elucidated in Shevuot 36b). And a high priest is also not obligated to testify except only for testimony [that pertains] to a king (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 1:3). And kings of Israel do not testify about others, and others [do not testify] about them, because of a case that happened, as it appears in Sanhedrin 19a in the chapter [entitled] Kohen Gadol. But kings of the House of David testify and [others] testify about them and judge them. And we do not withhold from accepting the testimony on account of love or hate, as “the remnant of Israel will not do injustice” in their testimony (Sanhedrin 27b). But regarding judgment, it is not so; as a friend and an enemy may not judge, because the enemy cannot see a merit and the friend cannot see a liability.
And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 3:4) that the main testimony of the Torah is from the mouth of witnesses and not from the mouth of their writing, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:6), “By the mouth, etc.”; except that because of the betterment of the world, such that people would find [those from whom] to borrow, the Sages ordained that we establish law with regard to money according to witnesses in a deed, the same as from their mouth. But Ramban, may his memory be blessed, (in the Sefer HaMitzvot at the end of the second root) challenged him greatly about this in the Sefer HaMitzvot. And if I would come to write the whole matter, it would be lengthy. But the essence of the thing is that Ramban, may his memory be blessed, holds that the testimony of a deed is from Torah writ, as it is written (Jeremiah 32:44), “write in the book, and seal.”
And from the laws of the commandment is also that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Ketuvot 18b) that any man who said (testified) his testimony in front of a court and they investigated him according to their will, may not go back and contradict anything from all that he said in front of them, and say that he erred or was inadvertent or that he remembered afterwards that the matter was not like he testified. And even if he gave a reason for his words, we do not listen to him. And also testimony in a deed is like testimony that the court investigated according to their will, and [so] the witnesses may not recant on anything in the deed. And we judge [the case] according to the signatories about everything written in the deed — and that is when we are sure that those signatories are the ones that signed the deed, not that a forger forged them. And this investigation we should do by way of men that recognized those signatures — that they are the writing of those people that are signed. And we need two witnesses that recognize the two signatures — each one of them that recognizes both of the witnesses. And so [too,] if two of the judges, themselves, recognize them, it is enough for us with that (Ketuvot 21b); or if the signatories, themselves, are in front of us and each one testifies about his signature, it is enough with that. But one cannot testify about his writing and the writing of his fellow (Ketuvot 20b). And so [too,] if the writing of their hand is [validated] from another place that is in front of us, we certify them from it. And it is explained in the Gemara (Ketuvot 20a) that we only certify a deed from two [other] deeds of two fields [through which] their owners ate [from] them openly without fear or trepidation about a claim from the [previous] owners; or from two marriage deeds (ketuvot) — and that is when they come from under the hand of another, not from under the hand of this one that wants validation [of the document], as we are concerned lest it is all a forgery. And so [too, we validate] from another deed that was challenged and [then] ratified by the court.
And that which they, may their memory be blessed, also said (Ketuvot 28a) that with testimony about a signature, a relative is trusted to testify about the writing of his relative, that he recognizes it — and he combines with another to validate the deed. And with this testimony a man is trusted when he is an adult to testify and say, “When I was small, I saw the writing of my father — or my brother — and I recognize it now, that it is the one that I saw.” And that which they said that ten creatures are disqualified for testimony from Torah writ, and like I wrote above in the commandment of “do not place your hand with an evildoer to be a witness” (Sefer HaChinukh 75). And so [too,] one who is not [involved] in Scripture, nor in Mishnah, nor in the way of the world (productive work) is disqualified by the words of [the Rabbis], as there is an assumption about him that he is an evildoer — and behold, it is written (Exodus 23:1), “do not place [...] an evildoer to be a witness.” But if he has [involvement] in the way of the world and is involved in some commandments, we accept his testimony, even though he is an ignoramus. You will be found to say that any Torah scholar is assumed to be fit until he is disqualified and [any] ignoramus is assumed to be disqualified until his status is established with us for the good. And so [too,] the most debased men are disqualified [rabbinically], such as those that eat in the marketplace in front of everyone. And included in the debased (Sanhedrin 26b) are those that consume the charity of gentiles publicly. And the rest of its details are elucidated in Sanhedrin and in Shevuot. (See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 1.)
And [it] is practiced in every place and at all times by males, but not by women — as women are not in the category of testimony due to the weakness of their minds. And one who transgresses it and does not testify — in monetary laws when he is solicited by a party in the case or [by] the court; and with capital laws, or blows or Torah prohibitions, on his own — has violated a positive commandment. And his punishment is very great, as civilizations are preserved with the power of testimony. Therefore, it is written about it (Leviticus 5:1), “if he does not say, he will carry his iniquity.” And if the testimony that he suppressed was monetary testimony and the witness denied it and swore about it — meaning to say, he swore that he does not know testimony for him — he is obligated to bring a sacrifice that varies up and down; and under the conditions that are known about the matter, as it is explained in its place in Shevuot 30a. And it is one of three sacrifices that come whether [it is] inadvertent or whether [it is] volitional.
מִצְוַת עֵדוּת – לְהַגִּיד הָעֵדוּת בִּפְנֵי (בר"ד לִפְנֵי) הַדַּיָּנִים. בְּכָל מָה שֶׁנֵּדָעֵהוּ, בֵּין שֶׁיִּתְחַיֵּב בָּעֵדוּת מִיתָה אוֹ מָמוֹן הַמּוּעָד עָלָיו אוֹ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַצָּלָתוֹ בְּמָמוֹנוֹ אוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ה א) וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע אִם לֹא יַגִּיד וְנָשָׂא עֲוֹנוֹ. בְּכָל עִנְיָן, חוֹבָה (רמב"ם פ"א עדות ה"א) עָלֵינוּ לְהַגִּיד הָעֵדוּת לִפְנֵי הַבֵּית דִּין (ב"ק נה ב).
The commandment of testimony: To say the testimony in front of the judges, in all that we know of it — whether with the testimony, [the accused] will become liable for death or money that is earmarked for him, or whether it will be his salvation for his money or for his life — as it is stated (Leviticus 5:1), “and he is a witness or saw or knew, if he does not say, he will carry his iniquity.” In every matter, it is an obligation (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 1:1) upon us to say the testimony in front of the court (Bava Kamma 55b).
וְאוּלָם חִלּוּק יֵשׁ בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת וּשְׁאָר אִסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, שֶׁבְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת אֵין אָדָם חַיָּב לְהָעִיד עֲלֵיהֶם מֵעַצְמוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יִתְבָּעֶנּוּ בַּעַל הַדָּבָר אוֹ בֵּית דִּין, וּבְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת וּשְׁאָר אִסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, כְּגוֹן שֶׁרָאָה אֶחָד שֶׁעָבַר עַל אִסּוּר, וְכֵן בְּעֵדוּת נְפָשׁוֹת, שֶׁרָאָה מִי שֶׁהָרַג חֲבֵרוֹ, אוֹ בְּעֵדוּת מַכּוֹת, שֶׁהִכָּה הָאֶחָד אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ, בְּכָל זֶה חַיָּב הָאָדָם לָבֹא מֵעַצְמוֹ וּלְהַגִּיד הָעֵדוּת לִפְנֵי הַבֵּית דִּין כְּדֵי לְבַעֵר הָרַע וּלְהַפְרִישׁ הָאָדָם מֵאִסּוּר.
However there is a difference between monetary laws, and capital and other laws in the Torah. As with monetary laws, a man is not obligated to testify about them on his own, unless a party in the case or the court solicits him. But with capital laws and other prohibitions in the Torah — for example, he saw someone that transgressed a prohibition; and so [too,] with capital testimony, that he saw someone kill his fellow; or in the testimony of blows, that one hit his fellow — with all of this, a man is obligated to come on his own and say the testimony in front of a court, so as to destroy the evil and to separate a man from a prohibition.
מִשָּׁרְשֵׁי הַמִּצְוָה. לְפִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּמִצְוָה זוֹ תּוֹעֶלֶת גְּדוֹלָה לִבְנֵי אָדָם, אֵין צָרִיךְ לְהַאֲרִיךְ בָּהֶם, כִּי יְדוּעִים הַדְּבָרִים לְכָל רוֹאֵי הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ.
It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] because there is great benefit to people with this commandment. It is not necessary to write at length about it, as the things are known to all who see the sun.
דִּינֵי הַמִּצְוָה. כְּגוֹן הַחִלּוּקִין שֶׁגִּלּוּ לָנוּ חֲכָמִים זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה שֶׁהֵם בְּמִצְוָה זוֹ בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִישׁ שֶׁלֹּא כָּל הָאָדָם חַיָּב לָבֹא לִפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין לְהָעִיד לָהֶם, שֶׁאִם הָיָה הָעֵד חָכָם גָּדוֹל וְהַבֵּית דִּין פָּחוּת מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ לְהִמָּנַע אִם יִרְצֶה מִלְּהָעִיד לִפְנֵיהֶם, שֶׁעֲשֵׂה שֶׁל כְּבוֹד תּוֹרָה דּוֹחֶה עֲשֵׂה דְּעֵדוּת, (כמבואר בשבועות לו ב). (רמב"ם שם ה"ג) וְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל גַּם כֵּן אֵינוֹ חַיָּב לְהָעִיד אֶלָּא עֵדוּת שֶׁהִיא לְמֶלֶךְ בִּלְבַד, וּמַלְכֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא מְעִידִין עַל אֲחֵרִים וְלֹא אֲחֵרִים עֲלֵיהֶם מִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה, כְּמוֹ שֶׁבָּא בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין פֶּרֶק כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל (סנהדרין יט א). אֲבָל מַלְכֵי בֵּית דָּוִד מְעִידִין וּמְעִידִין עֲלֵיהֶם, וְדָנִין אוֹתָם. וְאֵין (שם כז ב) נִמְנָעִין מִלְּקַבֵּל עֵדוּת בִּשְׁבִיל אַהֲבָה וְשִׂנְאָה, כִּי שְׁאֵרִית יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא יַעֲשׂוּ עַוְלָה בְּעֵדוּתָם. אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן הַדִּין אֵינוֹ כֵּן, שֶׁאֵין דָּנִין הָאוֹהֵב וְהַשּׂוֹנֵא, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַשּׂוֹנֵא אֵינוֹ רוֹאֶה זְכוּת, וְלֹא הָאוֹהֵב חוֹבָה.
The laws of the commandment: For example, the differences that the Sages, may their memory be blessed, revealed to us that there are in this commandment between one man and another, such that not every man is obligated to come in front of the court to testify to them: For example, if the witness was a great sage and the court less than he, he may — if he wants — withhold from testifying in front of them; as the positive commandment of honor of the Torah pushes off the positive commandment of testimony (as is elucidated in Shevuot 36b). And a high priest is also not obligated to testify except only for testimony [that pertains] to a king (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 1:3). And kings of Israel do not testify about others, and others [do not testify] about them, because of a case that happened, as it appears in Sanhedrin 19a in the chapter [entitled] Kohen Gadol. But kings of the House of David testify and [others] testify about them and judge them. And we do not withhold from accepting the testimony on account of love or hate, as “the remnant of Israel will not do injustice” in their testimony (Sanhedrin 27b). But regarding judgment, it is not so; as a friend and an enemy may not judge, because the enemy cannot see a merit and the friend cannot see a liability.
וְכָתַב הָרַמְבַּ"ם זִכְרוֹנוֹ לִבְרָכָה (שם פ"ג ה"ד) שֶׁעִקַּר עֵדוּת שֶׁל תּוֹרָה הוּא מִפִּי הָעֵדִים וְלֹא מִפִּי כְּתָבָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יז ו) עַל פִּי וְגוֹ'. אֶלָּא שֶׁחֲכָמִים מִפְּנֵי תִּקּוּן הָעוֹלָם שֶׁיִּמְצְאוּ בְּנֵי אָדָם לִלְוֹת תִּקְּנוּ שֶׁנַּחְתֹּךְ הַדִּין בְּמָמוֹן עַל פִּי עֵדִים שֶׁבִּשְׁטָר כְּמוֹ מִפִּיהֶם. וְהָרַמְבַּ"ן זִכְרוֹנוֹ לִבְרָכָה (בסהמ"צ בסוף השורש השני) הִקְשָׁה עָלָיו בְּסֵפֶר הַמִּצְוֹת הַרְבֵּה עַל זֶה וְיֶאֱרַךְ הָעִנְיָן אִם בָּאתִי לִכְתֹּב כֻּלּוֹ. וּכְלָל הַדָּבָר, כִּי הָרַמְבַּ"ן זִכְרוֹנוֹ לִבְרָכָה סוֹבֵר שֶׁעֵדוּת שְׁטָר דְּאוֹרָיְתָא הוּא, דִּכְתִיב (ירמיהו לב מד) וְכָתוֹב בַּסֵּפֶר וְחָתוֹם.
And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 3:4) that the main testimony of the Torah is from the mouth of witnesses and not from the mouth of their writing, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:6), “By the mouth, etc.”; except that because of the betterment of the world, such that people would find [those from whom] to borrow, the Sages ordained that we establish law with regard to money according to witnesses in a deed, the same as from their mouth. But Ramban, may his memory be blessed, (in the Sefer HaMitzvot at the end of the second root) challenged him greatly about this in the Sefer HaMitzvot. And if I would come to write the whole matter, it would be lengthy. But the essence of the thing is that Ramban, may his memory be blessed, holds that the testimony of a deed is from Torah writ, as it is written (Jeremiah 32:44), “write in the book, and seal.”
וּמִדִּינֵי הַמִּצְוָה. גַּם כֵּן מָה שֶׁאָמְרוּ זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה (כתובות יח ב) כָּל אָדָם שֶׁהִגִּיד (שֶׁהֵעִיד) עֲדוֹתוֹ בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וַחֲקָרוּהוּ כִּרְצוֹנָם אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר וְלִסְתֹּר דָּבָר מִכָּל מָה שֶׁהִגִּיד בִּפְנֵיהֶם וְלוֹמַר שֶׁמֻּטְעֶה אוֹ שׁוֹגֵג הָיָה אוֹ שֶׁנִּזְכַּר אַחַר כָּךְ שֶׁאֵין הַדָּבָר כְּמוֹ שֶׁהֵעִיד. וַאֲפִלּוּ נָתַן טַעַם לִדְבָרָיו אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וְכָל עֵדוּת שֶׁבִּשְׁטָר הֲרֵי הוּא כְּעֵדוּת שֶׁחֲקָרוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין כִּרְצוֹנָם וְשׁוּב אֵין הָעֵדִים יְכוֹלִים לַחְזֹר בָּהֶם בְּשׁוּם דָּבָר שֶׁבַּשְּׁטָר. וְדָנִין עַל פִּי הַחֲתוּמִין בְּכָל דָּבָר הַכָּתוּב בַּשְּׁטָר, וְהוּא שֶׁנִּהְיֶה בְּרִיאִים שֶׁאוֹתָם הַחֲתוּמִים הֵם שֶׁחֲתָמוּהוּ אוֹתוֹ שְׁטָר לָא זִיְּפָם מְזַיֵּף. וְזֹאת הַחֲקִירָה יֵשׁ לָנוּ לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ עַל פִּי אֲנָשִׁים שֶׁהִכִּירוּ אוֹתָן חֲתִימוֹת שֶׁהֵן כְּתִיבַת אוֹתָם הָאֲנָשִׁים הַחֲתוּמִים, וּצְרִיכִין אָנוּ שְׁנֵי עֵדִים שֶׁיַּכִּירוּ שְׁתֵּי הַחֲתִימוֹת, כָּל אַחַת מֵהֶן יַכִּירוּ שְׁנֵי הָעֵדִים. וְכֵן (שם כא ב) אִם שְׁנַיִם מִן הַדַּיָּנִים בְּעַצְמָן מַכִּירִין אוֹתָם דַּי לָנוּ בְּכָךְ, אוֹ (שם כ ב) אִם הַחֲתוּמִים בְּעַצְמָם לְפָנֵינוּ וְיָעִיד כָּל אֶחָד עַל חֲתִימָתוֹ דַּי בְּכָךְ, אֲבָל הָאֶחָד אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָעִיד עַל כְּתִיבָתוֹ וְעַל כְּתִיבַת חֲבֵרוֹ. וְכֵן אִם כְּתַב יָדָם יוֹצֵא מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר לְפָנֵינוּ מְקַיְּמִין מִמֶּנּוּ. וּמְפָרֵשׁ בַּגְּמָרָא (שם כ א) שֶׁאֵין מְקַיְּמִין שְׁטָר אֶלָּא מִשְּׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת שֶׁל שְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת שֶׁאֲכָלוּם בַּעֲלֵיהֶן שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים אֲכִילָה גְּלוּיָה בְּלֹא שׁוּם יִרְאָה וּפֻחַד מִן תְּבִיעַת בְּעָלִים, אוֹ מִשְּׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת שֶׁל כְּתֻבּוֹת, וְהוּא שֶׁיָּצְאוּ מִתַּחַת יְדֵי אַחֵר לֹא מִתַּחַת יְדֵי זֶה הָרוֹצֶה בְּקִיּוּם, דְּחָיְשִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא הַכֹּל זִיֵּף. וְכֵן מִשְּׁטָר אַחֵר שֶׁקָּרָא עָלָיו עַרְעָר וְהֻחְזַק בְּבֵית דִּין.
And from the laws of the commandment is also that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Ketuvot 18b) that any man who said (testified) his testimony in front of a court and they investigated him according to their will, may not go back and contradict anything from all that he said in front of them, and say that he erred or was inadvertent or that he remembered afterwards that the matter was not like he testified. And even if he gave a reason for his words, we do not listen to him. And also testimony in a deed is like testimony that the court investigated according to their will, and [so] the witnesses may not recant on anything in the deed. And we judge [the case] according to the signatories about everything written in the deed — and that is when we are sure that those signatories are the ones that signed the deed, not that a forger forged them. And this investigation we should do by way of men that recognized those signatures — that they are the writing of those people that are signed. And we need two witnesses that recognize the two signatures — each one of them that recognizes both of the witnesses. And so [too,] if two of the judges, themselves, recognize them, it is enough for us with that (Ketuvot 21b); or if the signatories, themselves, are in front of us and each one testifies about his signature, it is enough with that. But one cannot testify about his writing and the writing of his fellow (Ketuvot 20b). And so [too,] if the writing of their hand is [validated] from another place that is in front of us, we certify them from it. And it is explained in the Gemara (Ketuvot 20a) that we only certify a deed from two [other] deeds of two fields [through which] their owners ate [from] them openly without fear or trepidation about a claim from the [previous] owners; or from two marriage deeds (ketuvot) — and that is when they come from under the hand of another, not from under the hand of this one that wants validation [of the document], as we are concerned lest it is all a forgery. And so [too, we validate] from another deed that was challenged and [then] ratified by the court.
וּמָה שֶׁאָמְרוּ זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה גַּם כֵּן (כתובות כח א) שֶׁבְּעֵדוּת שֶׁל חֲתִימָה נֶאֱמָן קָרוֹב לְהָעִיד עַל כְּתִיבַת קְרוֹבוֹ שֶׁהוּא מַכִּירָהּ, וּמִצְטָרֵף עִם אַחֵר לְקַיֵּם הַשְּׁטָר, וְשֶׁבְּעֵדוּת זֶה נֶאֱמָן אָדָם בְּגָדְלוֹ לְהָעִיד וְלוֹמַר כְּשֶׁהָיִיתִי קָטָן רָאִיתִי כְּתַב אָבִי אוֹ אָחִי, וּמַכִּירָהּ אֲנִי עַכְשָׁו שֶׁהִיא אוֹתָהּ שֶׁרָאִיתִי. וּמָה שֶׁאָמְרוּ שֶׁעֲשָׂרָה בְּרִיּוֹת פְּסוּלוֹת לְעֵדוּת מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וּכְמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַבְנוּ לְמַעְלָה בְּמִצְוַת (מצוה עה) אַל תָּשֶׁת רָשָׁע עֵד. וְכֵן (וכמו) (קידושין מ ב) מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בַּמִּקְרָא וְלֹא בַּמִּשְׁנָה וְלֹא בְּדֶרֶךְ אֶרֶץ שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם, שֶׁחֲזָקָה עָלָיו שֶׁהוּא רָשָׁע, וַהֲרֵי כְּתִיב (שמות כג א) אַל תָּשֶׁת רָשָׁע עֵד. אֲבָל אִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ דֶּרֶךְ אֶרֶץ וְעוֹסֵק בִּקְצָת מִצְוֹת מְקַבְּלִין עֵדוּתוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא עַם הָאָרֶץ. נִמְצֵאתָ אוֹמֵר, כָּל תַּלְמִיד חָכָם בְּחֶזְקַת כָּשֵׁר עַד שֶׁיִּפָּסֵל, וְעַם הָאָרֶץ בְּחֶזְקַת פָּסוּל עַד שֶׁיֻּחְזַק עִמָּנוּ לְטוֹב. וְכֵן הָאֲנָשִׁים הַבְּזוּיִים בְּיוֹתֵר פְּסוּלִין מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם, כְּגוֹן הָאוֹכְלִין בַּשּׁוּק בִּפְנֵי הַכֹּל, וְהַהוֹלְכִים עֲרֻמִּים בַּשּׁוּק. וּמִכְּלַל הַבְּזוּיִים (סנהדרין כו ב) הָאוֹכְלִים צְדָקָה שֶׁל גּוֹיִם בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא. וְיֶתֶר פְּרָטֶיהָ, מְבֹאָרִים בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין וּשְׁבוּעוֹת [הלכות עדות פ"א]
And that which they, may their memory be blessed, also said (Ketuvot 28a) that with testimony about a signature, a relative is trusted to testify about the writing of his relative, that he recognizes it — and he combines with another to validate the deed. And with this testimony a man is trusted when he is an adult to testify and say, “When I was small, I saw the writing of my father — or my brother — and I recognize it now, that it is the one that I saw.” And that which they said that ten creatures are disqualified for testimony from Torah writ, and like I wrote above in the commandment of “do not place your hand with an evildoer to be a witness” (Sefer HaChinukh 75). And so [too,] one who is not [involved] in Scripture, nor in Mishnah, nor in the way of the world (productive work) is disqualified by the words of [the Rabbis], as there is an assumption about him that he is an evildoer — and behold, it is written (Exodus 23:1), “do not place [...] an evildoer to be a witness.” But if he has [involvement] in the way of the world and is involved in some commandments, we accept his testimony, even though he is an ignoramus. You will be found to say that any Torah scholar is assumed to be fit until he is disqualified and [any] ignoramus is assumed to be disqualified until his status is established with us for the good. And so [too,] the most debased men are disqualified [rabbinically], such as those that eat in the marketplace in front of everyone. And included in the debased (Sanhedrin 26b) are those that consume the charity of gentiles publicly. And the rest of its details are elucidated in Sanhedrin and in Shevuot. (See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 1.)
וְנוֹהֶגֶת בְּכָל מָקוֹם וּבְכָל זְמַן בִּזְכָרִים אֲבָל לֹא בְּנָשִׁים, שֶׁאֵין הַנָּשִׁים בְּתוֹרַת עֵדוּת לְקַלּוּת דַּעְתָּן. וְהָעוֹבֵר עָלֶיהָ וְלֹא הֵעִיד בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת כְּשֶׁתְּבָעוּהוּ לְעֵדוּת בַּעַל דָּבָר אוֹ בֵּית דִּין, אוֹ בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת וּמַכּוֹת וּבְאִסּוּרִין שֶׁל תּוֹרָה מֵעַצְמוֹ, בִּטֵּל עֲשֵׂה וְעָנְשׁוֹ גָּדוֹל מְאֹד, כִּי בְּכֹחַ הָעֵדוּת יִתְקַיְּמוּ הַיִּשּׁוּבִים, עַל כֵּן נִכְתַּב בּוֹ (ויקרא ה א) אִם לֹא יַגִּיד וְנָשָׂא עֲוֹנוֹ. וְאִם תִּהְיֶה הָעֵדוּת אֲשֶׁר כָּבַשׁ עֵדוּת מָמוֹן וְכִחֵשׁ בָּהּ הָעֵד וְנִשְׁבַּע עָלֶיהָ, כְּלוֹמַר שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ לוֹ עֵדוּת, חַיָּב לְהָבִיא קָרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד, וּבַתְּנָאִים הַיְּדוּעִים בָּעִנְיָן, כְּמוֹ שֶׁמְּפֹרָשׁ בִּמְקוֹמוֹ בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת. (ל א) וְהוּא אֶחָד מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה קָרְבָּנוֹת הַבָּאִין בֵּין עַל שׁוֹגֵג בֵּין עַל מֵזִיד. (כריתות ט א).
And [it] is practiced in every place and at all times by males, but not by women — as women are not in the category of testimony due to the weakness of their minds. And one who transgresses it and does not testify — in monetary laws when he is solicited by a party in the case or [by] the court; and with capital laws, or blows or Torah prohibitions, on his own — has violated a positive commandment. And his punishment is very great, as civilizations are preserved with the power of testimony. Therefore, it is written about it (Leviticus 5:1), “if he does not say, he will carry his iniquity.” And if the testimony that he suppressed was monetary testimony and the witness denied it and swore about it — meaning to say, he swore that he does not know testimony for him — he is obligated to bring a sacrifice that varies up and down; and under the conditions that are known about the matter, as it is explained in its place in Shevuot 30a. And it is one of three sacrifices that come whether [it is] inadvertent or whether [it is] volitional.