(Exodus 21:31) "Or if it gore a son, or it gore a daughter": Why is this stated? (Ibid. 29) "and it kill a man or a woman" tells me only of adults. Whence do I derive (the same for) minors? From "Or if it gore a son, or it gore a daughter." This tells me only of a distinct son or daughter. Whence do I derive (the same for) a tumtum (one of indeterminate sex) or a hermaphrodite? From "Or if it gore a son, or it gore a daughter." This tells me only of another's son or daughter. Whence do I derive (the same for) his own son or daughter? From "Or if it gore a son, or it gore a daughter" — in any event. This tells me only of (its goring) an Israelite. Whence do I derive the same for a proselyte? From (Ibid. 12:49) "One Torah shall there be for the citizen and for the proselyte."
(Exodus 21:31) "If the ox gore a man-servant or a maid-servant." These, too, were in the class of "and it kill a man or a woman," and Scripture singled them out for both lenity and severity. For lenity — If he were worth a hundred maneh, he pays thirty selaim. For severity — If he were worth only a dinar, he pays thirty selaim.
Variantly: "If the ox gore a man-servant or a maid-servant": Scripture speaks of a Canaanite (man-servant or maid-servant). But perhaps it speaks of an Israelite? (This cannot be, for) "silver, thirty shekels, shall he give to his master" indicates that a Canaanite is intended, (for if it were an Israelite, the money would go to his heirs.)
"silver, thirty shekels, shall he give to his master": whether a man or a woman.
6
דָּבָר אַחֵר: "וְהַשּׁוֹר יִסָּקֵל", לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? הָיָה בַכְּלָל וְיָצָא לִדּוֹן בְּחִדּוּשׁ,*הָיָה בַכְּלָל וְיָצָא לִדּוֹן בְּחִדּוּשׁ: זה אחד מן הכללים שבהם נדרשת התורה, כמו שנאמר בספרא בברייתא דרבי ישמעאל: כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל לידון בדבר חדש ואי אתה יכול להחזירו לכללו עד שיחזירנו הכתוב לכללו בפירוש. וְהֶחְזִירוֹ הַכָּתוּב לִכְלָלוֹ.
"and the ox shall be stoned": Why is this stated? (i.e., it was stated already.) For if it were not stated, I would say (otherwise), viz.: Since he is put to death for killing his man-servant or his maid-servant, and another is put to death for killing his man-servant or his maid-servant, and his ox is put to death for killing his man-servant or his maid-servant, and the ox of another is put to death for killing his man-servant or his maid-servant — then if you have learned to make a distinction between his or another's killing his man-servant or his maid-servant (viz. Ibid. 21:21), then we should also make a distinction between his or another's ox killing his man-servant or his maid-servant; it is, therefore, written "thirty shekalim … and the ox shall be stoned" (i.e., no such distinction is made.)
(Exodus 21:33) "And if a man open a pit": Why is this stated? It can be derived by reason, viz.: Since the ox is his possession and the pit is his possession, then if you have learned that he is liable for his ox, should he not be liable for his pit? No, this may be true of his ox, whose way it is to cause damage, as opposed to his pit, whose way it is not to go and cause and cause damage. It is, therefore, written "And if a man open a pit or if a man dig a pit." Because I have not been able to derive this by reason, it must be stated by itself.
"And if a man open": This tells me only of opening. Whence do I derive (the same for) digging? It is, therefore, written "if a man dig." But even if this were not stated, I could derive it a fortiori, viz.: If the opener is liable, how much more, so the digger! If you say this you have punished by an a fortiori argument. It is, therefore, written "if he dig" — to teach that punishment is not mandated by an a fortiori argument.
Variantly: "if a man open a pit": Opening is being likened to digging, and digging, to opening. Just as one who opens (a pit) with permission is exempt (from liability), so, one who digs it with permission. And just as digging (a pit) entails a specific size (for liability), so, opening.
12
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָה אוֹמֵר: לֹא הֲרֵי פוֹתֵחַ כַּהֲרֵי כוֹרֶה, וְלֹא כוֹרֶה כַּהֲרֵי פוֹתֵחַ; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב בְּשָׁמְרוֹ חַיָּב בְּנִזְקוֹ, אַף כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב בְּשָׁמְרוֹ חַיָּב בְּנִזְקוֹ. אֵין לִי אֶלָּא פוֹתֵחַ וְכוֹרֶה; סִיְּדוֹ וְכִיְּרוֹ*סִיְּדוֹ וְכִיְּרוֹ: טח אותו בסיד וגלף בטיח צורות בולטות. וְצִיְּרוֹ וְעָשָׂה בוֹ,*סִיְּדוֹ וְכִיְּרוֹ וְצִיְּרוֹ וְעָשָׂה בוֹ: עשה בו עבודות שונות שאינן פתיחה או כריה. מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ", הָא לֹא פְתִיחָה וְלֹא כִרְיָה גָרְמָה, אֶלָּא כִּסּוּי גּוֹרֵם.
R. Yehudah b. Betheira says: Opening (a pit) is not like digging, or digging, like opening. What is common to them is that wherever one is liable for guarding it, he is liable for the damage that it causes — so, in all instances, wherever one is liable for guarding, he is liable for the damage. This tells me only of opening and digging. Whence do I derive (the same for) figuring, paneling, plastering or performing any other act in it (to which the damage is attributable)? From "and he not cover it." It is not opening or digging which is the criterion (for liability), but covering (i.e., failure to cover it).
13
"וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ", לְהָבִיא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.
Variantly: "and he not cover it": to include liability for (even) a non-paid watchman (who fails to cover it).
Variantly: "and he not cover it": and he not cover it properly — whence they ruled: If he covered it properly, he is exempt; if improperly, he is liable. If he covered it and another uncovered it, the second is liable. If partners covered a pit and one of them uncovered it, the second is liable. If it were uncovered and one of them knew of it, the one who knew of it is liable, and the other, exempt.
"and there fall there an ox or an ass": He is liable for each in itself. "an ox": and not an ox and its trappings. "an ass": and not an ass and its trapping. For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If in a place (i.e., where he lit a fire), where he is not liable for a beast (that was burned), he is liable for vessels, here, where he is liable for the beast, how much more so should he be liable for vessels! It is, therefore, written "and there fall into it an ox or an ass": an ox, and not its trappings; an ass, and not its trappings.
"and there fall there": in the (normal) mode of falling — whence they ruled: If it fell before it (the pit) because of the sound of the digging, he (the digger) is liable. (If it fell) behind it because of the sound of the digging, he is exempt. But (if he fell into) the pit itself, whether (walking) before it or (walking) behind it, he is liable.
"Money shall he restore to its owner': This tells me only of money. Whence do I derive the same for a beast? (i.e., that he may pay with a beast.) It follows, viz.: It is written here "and the carcass shall belong to him," and elsewhere, (Exodus 21:36) "Then shall he pay an ox for an ox, and the carcass shall belong to him. Just as there (he pays) a beast, so, here (he may pay) a beast. Just as here, money; so, there, money.
"and the carcass shall belong to him": to him who sustained the loss. You say this, but perhaps it belongs to him who caused the loss? (This cannot be, for) if so, why need it be mentioned "and the carcass shall belong to him?" (i.e., If he must compensate for the entire loss, then certainly the carcass belongs to him.) (It must be, then, that the carcass belongs to him who sustained the loss) and the intent of the verse is that the value of the carcass is deducted from the total loss (and that amount is restored in addition to the carcass.)
(שמות כא,לא) "אוֹ בֵן יִגָּח אוֹ בַת יִגָּח כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הַזֶּה יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ." לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? לְפִי שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: (שמות כא,כט) "וְהֵמִית אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה", אֵין לִי אֶלָּא גְּדוֹלִים, קְטַנִּים מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "אוֹ בֵן יִגָּח אוֹ בַת יִגָּח". אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בֶּן גָּמוּר אוֹ בַּת גְּמוּרָה, טוּמְטוּם וְאַנְדְּרוֹגִינוֹס מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "אוֹ בֵן יִגָּח אוֹ בַת יִגָּח". אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ שֶׁלְּאַחֵר, בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ שֶׁלְּעַצְמוֹ מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (שמות כא,ט) "כְּמִשְׁפַּט הַבָּנוֹת יַעֲשֶׂה לָּהּ." אֵין לִי אֶלָּא יִשְׂרָאֵל, גֵּרִים מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הַזֶּה יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ."
(Exodus 21:31) "Or if it gore a son, or it gore a daughter": Why is this stated? (Ibid. 29) "and it kill a man or a woman" tells me only of adults. Whence do I derive (the same for) minors? From "Or if it gore a son, or it gore a daughter." This tells me only of a distinct son or daughter. Whence do I derive (the same for) a tumtum (one of indeterminate sex) or a hermaphrodite? From "Or if it gore a son, or it gore a daughter." This tells me only of another's son or daughter. Whence do I derive (the same for) his own son or daughter? From "Or if it gore a son, or it gore a daughter" — in any event. This tells me only of (its goring) an Israelite. Whence do I derive the same for a proselyte? From (Ibid. 12:49) "One Torah shall there be for the citizen and for the proselyte."
(שמות כא,לב) "אִם עֶבֶד יִגַּח הַשּׁוֹר אוֹ אָמָה, כֶּסֶף שְׁלֹשִׁים שְׁקָלִים יִתֵּן לַאדֹנָיו וְהַשּׁוֹר יִסָּקֵל." אַף עֶבֶד וְאָמָה הָיוּ בַכְּלָל, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: (שמות כא,כט) "וְהֵמִית אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה". וַהֲרֵי הַכָּתוּב מוֹצִיאוֹ מִכְּלָלוֹ, לְהָקֵל עָלָיו וּלְהַחְמִיר עָלָיו: לְהָקֵל עָלָיו, שֶׁאִם הָיָה יָפֶה מֵאָה מָנֶה, נוֹתֵן לוֹ שְׁלֹשִׁים סֶלַע; לְהַחְמִיר עָלָיו, שֶׁאִם אֵינוֹ יָפֶה אֶלָּא דֵּינָר זָהָב, נוֹתֵן לוֹ שְׁלֹשִׁים סֶלַע.
(Exodus 21:31) "If the ox gore a man-servant or a maid-servant." These, too, were in the class of "and it kill a man or a woman," and Scripture singled them out for both lenity and severity. For lenity — If he were worth a hundred maneh, he pays thirty selaim. For severity — If he were worth only a dinar, he pays thirty selaim.
"אִם עֶבֶד יִגַּח הַשּׁוֹר, אוֹ אָמָה". לְחַיֵּב עַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ.
"If the ox gore a man-servant or a maid-servant" — to make him liable for each one individually.
דָּבָר אַחֵר: "אִם עֶבֶד יִגַּח הַשּׁוֹר, אוֹ אָמָה", בַּכְּנַעֲנִי הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אוֹ אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בָּעִבְרִי? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר "כֶּסֶף שְׁלֹשִׁים שְׁקָלִים יִתֵּן לַאדֹנָיו", הֲרֵי בַכְּנַעֲנִי הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
Variantly: "If the ox gore a man-servant or a maid-servant": Scripture speaks of a Canaanite (man-servant or maid-servant). But perhaps it speaks of an Israelite? (This cannot be, for) "silver, thirty shekels, shall he give to his master" indicates that a Canaanite is intended, (for if it were an Israelite, the money would go to his heirs.)
"כֶּסֶף שְׁלֹשִׁים שְׁקָלִים יִתֵּן לַאדֹנָיו", אֶחָד אִישׁ וְאֶחָד אִשָּׁה.
"silver, thirty shekels, shall he give to his master": whether a man or a woman.
דָּבָר אַחֵר: "וְהַשּׁוֹר יִסָּקֵל", לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? הָיָה בַכְּלָל וְיָצָא לִדּוֹן בְּחִדּוּשׁ,*הָיָה בַכְּלָל וְיָצָא לִדּוֹן בְּחִדּוּשׁ: זה אחד מן הכללים שבהם נדרשת התורה, כמו שנאמר בספרא בברייתא דרבי ישמעאל: כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל לידון בדבר חדש ואי אתה יכול להחזירו לכללו עד שיחזירנו הכתוב לכללו בפירוש. וְהֶחְזִירוֹ הַכָּתוּב לִכְלָלוֹ.
"וְהַשּׁוֹר יִסָּקֵל", לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? עַד שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר, יֵשׁ לִי בַדִּין: הוֹאִיל וְהוּא בְמִיתָה עַל עַבְדּוֹ וְעַל אֲמָתוֹ, וְאַחַר בְּמִיתָה עַל עַבְדּוֹ וְעַל אֲמָתוֹ, וְשׁוֹרוֹ בְּמִיתָה עַל עַבְדּוֹ וְעַל אֲמָתוֹ, וְשׁוֹר אַחֵר בְּמִיתָה עַל עַבְדּוֹ וְעַל אֲמָתוֹ, אִם לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁחָלַק בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין אַחֵר בְּמִיתָה עַל עַבְדּוֹ וְעַל אֲמָתוֹ, נַחְלֹק בֵּין שׁוֹרוֹ לְשׁוֹר אַחֵר בְּמִיתָה עַל עַבְדּוֹ וַאֲמָתוֹ! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְהַשּׁוֹר יִסָּקֵל." מַגִּיד הַכָּתוּב, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחָלַק בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין אַחֵר בְּמִיתָה עַל עַבְדּוֹ וְעַל אֲמָתוֹ, לֹא נַחְלֹק בֵּין שׁוֹרוֹ לְשׁוֹר אַחֵר בְּמִיתָה עַל עַבְדּוֹ וְעַל אֲמָתוֹ.
"and the ox shall be stoned": Why is this stated? (i.e., it was stated already.) For if it were not stated, I would say (otherwise), viz.: Since he is put to death for killing his man-servant or his maid-servant, and another is put to death for killing his man-servant or his maid-servant, and his ox is put to death for killing his man-servant or his maid-servant, and the ox of another is put to death for killing his man-servant or his maid-servant — then if you have learned to make a distinction between his or another's killing his man-servant or his maid-servant (viz. Ibid. 21:21), then we should also make a distinction between his or another's ox killing his man-servant or his maid-servant; it is, therefore, written "thirty shekalim … and the ox shall be stoned" (i.e., no such distinction is made.)
(שמות כא,לג) ["וְכִי יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר, אוֹ כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בֹּר, וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ וְנָפַל שָׁמָּה שּׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר."] "וְכִי יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר". לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? עַד שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר, יֵשׁ לִי בַדִּין: הוֹאִיל וְהַשּׁוֹר מָמוֹנוֹ, וְהַבּוֹר מָמוֹנוֹ, אִם לָמַדְתָּ עַל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב עַל יְדֵי שׁוֹרוֹ, לֹא יְהֵי חַיָּב עַל יְדֵי בוֹרוֹ? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "אוֹ כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בֹּר". הָא לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא זָכִיתִי מִן הַדִּין, צָרִיךְ הַכָּתוּב לַהֲבִיאוֹ.
(Exodus 21:33) "And if a man open a pit": Why is this stated? It can be derived by reason, viz.: Since the ox is his possession and the pit is his possession, then if you have learned that he is liable for his ox, should he not be liable for his pit? No, this may be true of his ox, whose way it is to cause damage, as opposed to his pit, whose way it is not to go and cause and cause damage. It is, therefore, written "And if a man open a pit or if a man dig a pit." Because I have not been able to derive this by reason, it must be stated by itself.
דָּבָר אַחֵר: "וְכִי יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר, אוֹ כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בֹּר, וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ, וְנָפַל שָׁמָּה שּׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר." לְחַיֵּב עַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, וְעַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ.
דָּבָר אַחֵר: "וְכִי יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר", אֵין לִי אֶלָּא פוֹתֵחַ, כּוֹרֶה מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "אוֹ כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בֹּר". עַד שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר, יֵשׁ לִי בַדִּין: אִם הַפּוֹתֵחַ חַיָּב, הַכּוֹרֶה לֹא יְהֵי חַיָּב? הָא אִם אָמַרְתָּ כֵּן, עָנַשְׁתָּ מִן הַדִּין! לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר "אוֹ כִּי יִכְרֶה", לְלַמְּדָךְ שֶׁאֵין עוֹנְשִׁין מִן הַדִּין.
"And if a man open": This tells me only of opening. Whence do I derive (the same for) digging? It is, therefore, written "if a man dig." But even if this were not stated, I could derive it a fortiori, viz.: If the opener is liable, how much more, so the digger! If you say this you have punished by an a fortiori argument. It is, therefore, written "if he dig" — to teach that punishment is not mandated by an a fortiori argument.
דָּבָר אַחֵר: "וְכִי יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר אוֹ כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בֹּר", הִקִּישׁ פּוֹתֵחַ לַכּוֹרֶה וְכוֹרֶה לַפּוֹתֵחַ: מַה פּוֹתֵחַ בִּרְשׁוּת פָּטוּר, אַף כּוֹרֶה בִּרְשׁוּת פָּטוּר; וּמַה כּוֹרֶה כַּשִּׁעוּר, אַף פּוֹתֵחַ כַּשִּׁעוּר.
Variantly: "if a man open a pit": Opening is being likened to digging, and digging, to opening. Just as one who opens (a pit) with permission is exempt (from liability), so, one who digs it with permission. And just as digging (a pit) entails a specific size (for liability), so, opening.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָה אוֹמֵר: לֹא הֲרֵי פוֹתֵחַ כַּהֲרֵי כוֹרֶה, וְלֹא כוֹרֶה כַּהֲרֵי פוֹתֵחַ; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב בְּשָׁמְרוֹ חַיָּב בְּנִזְקוֹ, אַף כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב בְּשָׁמְרוֹ חַיָּב בְּנִזְקוֹ. אֵין לִי אֶלָּא פוֹתֵחַ וְכוֹרֶה; סִיְּדוֹ וְכִיְּרוֹ*סִיְּדוֹ וְכִיְּרוֹ: טח אותו בסיד וגלף בטיח צורות בולטות. וְצִיְּרוֹ וְעָשָׂה בוֹ,*סִיְּדוֹ וְכִיְּרוֹ וְצִיְּרוֹ וְעָשָׂה בוֹ: עשה בו עבודות שונות שאינן פתיחה או כריה. מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ", הָא לֹא פְתִיחָה וְלֹא כִרְיָה גָרְמָה, אֶלָּא כִּסּוּי גּוֹרֵם.
R. Yehudah b. Betheira says: Opening (a pit) is not like digging, or digging, like opening. What is common to them is that wherever one is liable for guarding it, he is liable for the damage that it causes — so, in all instances, wherever one is liable for guarding, he is liable for the damage. This tells me only of opening and digging. Whence do I derive (the same for) figuring, paneling, plastering or performing any other act in it (to which the damage is attributable)? From "and he not cover it." It is not opening or digging which is the criterion (for liability), but covering (i.e., failure to cover it).
"וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ", לְהָבִיא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.
Variantly: "and he not cover it": to include liability for (even) a non-paid watchman (who fails to cover it).
"וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ", כָּרָאוּי לוֹ. מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: כִּסָּהוּ כָרָאוּי, פָּטוּר; שֶׁלֹּא כָרָאוּי, חַיָּב. כִּסָּהוּ, וְגִלָּהוּ אַחֵר, הַמְגַלֶּה חַיָּב. הַשּׁוּתָפִין שֶׁכִּסּוּ אֶת הַבּוֹר, אִם גִּלָּהוּ אֶחָד מֵהֶם, הַמְגַלֶּה חַיָּב. נִתְגַּלָּה וְיָדַע בּוֹ אֶחָד, זֶה שֶׁיָּדַע בּוֹ חַיָּב, וְזֶה שֶׁלֹּא יָדַע בּוֹ פָטוּר.
Variantly: "and he not cover it": and he not cover it properly — whence they ruled: If he covered it properly, he is exempt; if improperly, he is liable. If he covered it and another uncovered it, the second is liable. If partners covered a pit and one of them uncovered it, the second is liable. If it were uncovered and one of them knew of it, the one who knew of it is liable, and the other, exempt.
"וְנָפַל שָׁמָּה שּׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר." "שׁוֹר", וְלֹא שׁוֹר וְכֵלָיו, "חֲמוֹר", וְלֹא חֲמוֹר וְכֵלָיו. שֶׁהָיָה בַדִּין: וּמָה, אִם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא חַיָּב עַל הַבְּהֵמָה, חַיָּב עַל הַכֵּלִים, וְכָן שֶׁחַיָּב עַל הַבְּהֵמָה, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵי חַיָּב עַל הַכֵּלִים? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְנָפַל שָׁמָּה שּׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר." "שׁוֹר" וְלֹא כֵלָיו, "חֲמוֹר" וְלֹא כֵלָיו.
"and there fall there an ox or an ass": He is liable for each in itself. "an ox": and not an ox and its trappings. "an ass": and not an ass and its trapping. For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If in a place (i.e., where he lit a fire), where he is not liable for a beast (that was burned), he is liable for vessels, here, where he is liable for the beast, how much more so should he be liable for vessels! It is, therefore, written "and there fall into it an ox or an ass": an ox, and not its trappings; an ass, and not its trappings.
"וְנָפַל שָׁמָּה", בְּדֶרֶךְ הִלּוּכוֹ. מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: נָפַל לְפָנָיו מִקּוֹל הַכִּרְיָה, חַיָּב; לְאַחֲרָיו מִקּוֹל הַכִּרְיָה, פָּטוּר. אֲבָל בַּבּוֹר, בֵּין לְפָנָיו וּבֵין לְאַחֲרָיו, חַיָּב.
"and there fall there": in the (normal) mode of falling — whence they ruled: If it fell before it (the pit) because of the sound of the digging, he (the digger) is liable. (If it fell) behind it because of the sound of the digging, he is exempt. But (if he fell into) the pit itself, whether (walking) before it or (walking) behind it, he is liable.
(שמות כא,לד) ["בַּעַל הַבּוֹר יְשַׁלֵּם, כֶּסֶף יָשִׁיב לִבְעָלָיו, וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לּוֹ."] "בַּעַל הַבּוֹר יְשַׁלֵּם", מִכָּל מָקוֹם.
"the owner of the pit shall pay": in any event (i.e., whether before or behind it).
"כֶּסֶף יָשִׁיב לִבְעָלָיו". אֵין לִי אֶלָּא כֶּסֶף, בְּהֵמָה מְנַיִן? הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן: נֶאֱמַר כָּן "וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לּוֹ", וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן (שמות כא,לו) "וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לּוֹ." מַה לְּהַלָּן בְּהֵמָה, אַף כָּן בְּהֵמָה; מָה כָּן כֶּסֶף, אַף לְהַלָּן כֶּסֶף.
"Money shall he restore to its owner': This tells me only of money. Whence do I derive the same for a beast? (i.e., that he may pay with a beast.) It follows, viz.: It is written here "and the carcass shall belong to him," and elsewhere, (Exodus 21:36) "Then shall he pay an ox for an ox, and the carcass shall belong to him. Just as there (he pays) a beast, so, here (he may pay) a beast. Just as here, money; so, there, money.
"וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לּוֹ", לַנִּזָּק. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לַנִּזָּק, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לַמַּזִּיק? אָמַרְתָּ, אִלּוּ כֵּן הָיָה, מַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לּוֹ"? לַנִּזָּק! אֶלָּא מַגִּיד שֶׁשָּׁמִין דְּמֵי נִבְלָתוֹ, וּמְנַכֶּה לוֹ דְמֵי נִזְקוֹ.
"and the carcass shall belong to him": to him who sustained the loss. You say this, but perhaps it belongs to him who caused the loss? (This cannot be, for) if so, why need it be mentioned "and the carcass shall belong to him?" (i.e., If he must compensate for the entire loss, then certainly the carcass belongs to him.) (It must be, then, that the carcass belongs to him who sustained the loss) and the intent of the verse is that the value of the carcass is deducted from the total loss (and that amount is restored in addition to the carcass.)