(Exodus 22:6) "If a man give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch": R. Yishmael says: He must deposit it with him, explicitly, saying "Here, watch this for me"; but if he just says "Keep an eye on it," he is not liable.
"money or vessels": Just as money tends to be counted, so, vessels that tend to be counted — whence it was ruled: Any claim which is not susceptible of measurement, weighing and counting is not a claim.
R. Nathan says: "money": to include money of (second-) tithe, (which, unlike first-tithe, reverts not to the Temple, but to the owner.) "vessels": to include any vessel. This tells me only of money and vessels. Whence do I derive (the same for) all things? From "to watch": to include any thing which requires watching.
"and it be stolen from the house of the man": to exempt (from kefel) one who steals from the thief. But perhaps the meaning is "and it be stolen from the house of the man, he pays double," but if it be found in his (the watcher's) possession, then even though he swore (that it was stolen), he is not liable (for kefel). It is, therefore, written (22:3) "If the theft be found in his hand, double shall he pay" — in any event (i.e., even if it were found in the watcher's possession. It is not the second assumption, then, which is to be posited, but the first, viz.: "and it be stolen from the hand of the man" — to exempt (from kefel) one who steals from the thief.
"if the thief is found, he pays double": A thief (one who steals by stealth) pays kefel, but not a robber (one who steals openly). Why did Scripture see fit to be more severe with a thief than with a robber? R. Yochanan says: A robber likens the honor of a servant to the honor of his Master, (not fearing both). A thief accords more honor to a servant than to His Master, (fearing the first, but not the second). A thief makes the Eye on high, unseeing, as it were, and the Ear, unhearing. As it is written (Isaiah 29:15) "Woe unto those who would probe deeper than the L–rd, to conceal (their) counsel, doing their work in the dark; saying: 'Who sees us? Who notices us?'" And (Psalms 94:7) "They say 'The L–rd does not see; the G–d of Jacob does not understand.'" And (Ezekiel 9:9) "For they said 'The L–rd has forsaken the land; the eye of the L–rd does not see.'"
(Exodus 22:7) "If the thief not be found": What is the intent of this? From "If the thief is found, he shall pay double," I understand that if the thief is found and he has (what to pay) the watcher is not liable for anything. Whence do I derive that if the thief is found and does not have what to pay, the owner of the stolen objects may not say to the watcher: "Come and swear to me that it did not enter your heart to sell them"? From "If the thief not be found," implying that if the thief were found, the watcher is not liable for anything (even if the thief does not have what to pay.)
"then the master of the house shall draw near": I might think, to inquire of the urim vetumim (on the breast-plate of the high-priest.) It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 8) "whom elohim incriminate." Elohim who incriminate (i.e., judges) are intended.
"then the master of the house (i.e., the watcher) shall draw near to the judges": For an oath. You say, for an oath. But, perhaps for an oath or not for an oath? It follows (that it is for an oath), viz.: "sending forth of the hand" is stated here, and it is stated elsewhere (viz. Ibid. 10). "Just as there, with an oath, so, here, with an oath. Just as there, with "Yod-Keh" (the Name of the L–rd), so, here, with "Yod-Keh." Just as here, in beth-din, so, there, in beth-din. Just as there, (he must swear that he did not use it for) his own need, so, here, for his own need. Just as there, (Ibid. 8) "For every matter of offense," so, here, "for every matter of offense."
(Ibid. 7) "that he did not send his hand against his neighbor's deposit": for his need. You say, for his need. But perhaps for his need or not for his need (but for the animal's)? It is, therefore, (to negate this) written "For every matter of offense." Variantly: "For every matter of offense": (As per the difference between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel,) Beth Shammai saying: One is liable (even) for negative intent vis-à-vis "sending forth the hand." It being written "For every matter of offense," ("offense" subsuming negative intent). And Beth Hillel say: One is not liable until he actually sends forth his hand, this being the thrust of "that he did not send forth his hand."
"For every matter of offense" — general. "for an ox, for an ass, for a lamb, for a garment" — particular. General-particular (The rule is:) There is subsumed in the general only what obtains in the particular. "for every lost object about which he will say" — reversion to the general. But perhaps (the idea is) to revert to the original generalization? Would you say that? We have here an instance of general-particular-general, (where the rule is:) The general is understood to be of the nature of the particular, viz. (In this instance,) Just as the particular are explicitly only movable, non-mortgaged possessions, so, the general (must be of that nature).
Variantly: "for an ox, for an ass": Why is this stated? Because it is written (earlier [6]) "If a man give to his neighbor money or vessels, etc." and (later 9]) "If a man give to his neighbor an ox or a lamb, etc.", Scripture comes here [8] to discriminate between (the first) watcher, (an unpaid watcher), and the second, (a paid watcher). But perhaps Scripture comes to differentiate between [6] "money or vessels" and [9] "beast"? It is, therefore, written [8] "for an ox, for an ass," (indicating that this is not its purpose, but, rather to discriminate between watcher and watcher.)
"about which he will say that it is this": i.e., the first says, it is this, and the second, it is not (exactly) this — whence they ruled: (The oath is administered) only where there is admission to part of the claim.
(22:7) "then the master of the house shall draw near to elohim (judge) — one, (Ibid. 8) "until elohim shall come the matter of both" — two. (Ibid.) "Whom elohim shall incriminate" — three. From here they ruled: Monetary litigations are (judged) by three. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah.
R. Yonathan says: The first was stated in the beginning, and "beginnings are not expounded." "until elohim shall come the matter of both" — one. "Whom elohim shall incriminate" — two. And "there is no evenly balanced beth-din," wherefore one is added to them — so that we have three.
Rebbi says: "until elohim shall come the matter of both. Scripture speaks of two. You say this, but perhaps it speaks of one" — It is not written "Whom elohim shall incriminate ("yarshiyen," with a vav, [which would signify two]), but "yarshian," (without the vav, which signifies one), so that, (all together) Scripture speaks of two. And "there is no equally balanced beth-din," wherefore one is added to them — so that we have three. From here they ruled: Monetary litigations are (judged) by three.
"he shall pay double to his neighbor": R. Shimon says: I read here "he shall pay double to his neighbor," and elsewhere, (Leviticus 5:24) "and he shall pay it (the principal) at its head (and its fifth shall he add to it)!" How are these two verses to be reconciled? One who pays (only) the principal must pay the fifth, and one who pays kefel is exempt from the fifth. "to his neighbor," and not to the Temple; "to his neighbor," and not to others (i.e., idolators).
(שמות כב,ו) "כִּי יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל רֵעֵהוּ כֶּסֶף אוֹ כֵלִים לִשְׁמֹר, וְגֻנַּב מִבֵּית הָאִישׁ, אִם יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב, יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנָיִם." רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיִּפְקֹד אֶצְלוֹ 'הֵילָךְ, שְׁמֹר לִי זֶה!' אֲבָל אִם אָמַר לוֹ 'עֵינֶיךָ בוֹ', הֲרֵי זֶה פָטוּר.
(Exodus 22:6) "If a man give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch": R. Yishmael says: He must deposit it with him, explicitly, saying "Here, watch this for me"; but if he just says "Keep an eye on it," he is not liable.
"כֶּסֶף אוֹ כֵלִים". מַה כֶּסֶף, שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהִמָּנוֹת, אַף כֵּלִים שֶׁדַּרְכָּן לְהִמָּנוֹת. מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: (ע' שבועות ו,ו) כָּל טַעֲנָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ בְּמִדָּה בְּמִשְׁקָל וּבְמִנְיָן, אֵינָהּ טַעֲנָה.
"money or vessels": Just as money tends to be counted, so, vessels that tend to be counted — whence it was ruled: Any claim which is not susceptible of measurement, weighing and counting is not a claim.
רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: "כֶּסֶף", לְהָבִיא כֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר; "כֵלִים", לְהָבִיא כֵלִים. וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא כֶּסֶף וְכֵלִים, וּשְׁאָר כָּל דָּבָר, מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "לִשְׁמֹר", לְהָבִיא כָל דָּבָר שֶׁצָּרִיךְ שְׁמִירָה.
R. Nathan says: "money": to include money of (second-) tithe, (which, unlike first-tithe, reverts not to the Temple, but to the owner.) "vessels": to include any vessel. This tells me only of money and vessels. Whence do I derive (the same for) all things? From "to watch": to include any thing which requires watching.
"וְגֻנַּב מִבֵּית הָאִישׁ". לְפְטֹר הַגּוֹנֵב מֵאַחַר הַגַּנָּב. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר "וְגֻנַּב מִבֵּית הָאִישׁ", לְפְטֹר הַגּוֹנֵב מֵאַחַר הַגַּנָּב, אוֹ "וְגֻנַּב מִבֵּית הָאִישׁ, אִם יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב, יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנָיִם"? אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁלֹּא נִמְצָא בִרְשׁוּתוֹ, אֲבָל אִם נִמְצָא בִרְשׁוּתוֹ, שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי, יִשָּׁבַע וִיהֵי פָטוּר! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (שמות כב,ג) "אִם הִמָּצֵא תִמָּצֵא בְיָדוֹ הַגְּנֵבָה", מִכָּל מָקוֹם. הָא אֵין עָלֶיךָ לוֹמַר כְּלָשׁוֹן אַחֲרוֹן, אֶלָּא כְּלָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן: "וְגֻנַּב מִבֵּית הָאִישׁ", לְפְטֹר הַגּוֹנֵב מֵאַחַר הַגַּנָּב.
"and it be stolen from the house of the man": to exempt (from kefel) one who steals from the thief. But perhaps the meaning is "and it be stolen from the house of the man, he pays double," but if it be found in his (the watcher's) possession, then even though he swore (that it was stolen), he is not liable (for kefel). It is, therefore, written (22:3) "If the theft be found in his hand, double shall he pay" — in any event (i.e., even if it were found in the watcher's possession. It is not the second assumption, then, which is to be posited, but the first, viz.: "and it be stolen from the hand of the man" — to exempt (from kefel) one who steals from the thief.
"אִם יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב, יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנָיִם." הַגַּנָּב מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, וְהַגַּזְלָן אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא קֶרֶן. וּמָה רָאַת הַתּוֹרָה לְהַחְמִיר עַל הַגַּנָּב יוֹתֵר מִן הַגַּזְלָן? רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּי אוֹמֵר: הַגַּזְלָן הִשְׁוָה כְבוֹד הָעֶבֶד לְקוֹנָיו, וְהַגַּנָּב חָלַק כָּבוֹד לָעֶבֶד יוֹתֵר מִקּוֹנָיו. כִּבְיָכֹל הַגַּנָּב עָשָׂה אֶת הָעַיִן כְּאִלּוּ אֵינָהּ רוֹאָה, וְאֶת הָאֹזֶן כְּאִלּוּ אֵינָהּ שׁוֹמַעַת, כָּעִנְיָן שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: (ישעיה כט,טו) "הוֹי הַמַּעֲמִיקִים מֵיי לַסְתִּר עֵצָה, וְהָיָה בְמַחְשָׁךְ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם, וַיֹּאמְרוּ: מִי רֹאֵנוּ, וּמִי יֹדְעֵנוּ?" וְאוֹמֵר (תהלים צד,ז) "וַיֹּאמְרוּ: לֹא יִרְאֶה יָּהּ", וְאוֹמֵר: (יחזקאל ט,ט) "כִּי אָמְרוּ: עָזַב יי אֶת הָאָרֶץ, וְאֵין יי רֹאֶה."
"if the thief is found, he pays double": A thief (one who steals by stealth) pays kefel, but not a robber (one who steals openly). Why did Scripture see fit to be more severe with a thief than with a robber? R. Yochanan says: A robber likens the honor of a servant to the honor of his Master, (not fearing both). A thief accords more honor to a servant than to His Master, (fearing the first, but not the second). A thief makes the Eye on high, unseeing, as it were, and the Ear, unhearing. As it is written (Isaiah 29:15) "Woe unto those who would probe deeper than the L–rd, to conceal (their) counsel, doing their work in the dark; saying: 'Who sees us? Who notices us?'" And (Psalms 94:7) "They say 'The L–rd does not see; the G–d of Jacob does not understand.'" And (Ezekiel 9:9) "For they said 'The L–rd has forsaken the land; the eye of the L–rd does not see.'"
(שמות כב,ז) "אִם לֹא יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב, וְנִקְרַב בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אֶל הָאֱלֹהִים, אִם לֹא שָׁלַח יָדוֹ בִּמְלֶאכֶת רֵעֵהוּ." לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? מִמַּשְׁמָע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כב,ו) "אִם יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב, יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנָיִם", לָמַדְנוּ שֶׁאִם נִמְצָא הַגַּנָּב, בַּעַל הַבַּיִת פָּטוּר מִכָּל דָּבָר! וּמַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "אִם לֹא יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב"? שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי, שֶׁאִם נִמְצָא הַגַּנָּב וְאֵין לוֹ מַה לְּשַׁלֵּם, לֹא יֹאמַר לוֹ בַּעַל הַגְּנֵבָה: בֹּא וְהִשָּׁבַע לִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְלִבָּךְ לְמָכְרָן! לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר "אִם לֹא יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב", שֶׁאִם נִמְצָא הַגַּנָּב, בַּעַל הַבַּיִת פָּטוּר מִכָּל דָּבָר.
(Exodus 22:7) "If the thief not be found": What is the intent of this? From "If the thief is found, he shall pay double," I understand that if the thief is found and he has (what to pay) the watcher is not liable for anything. Whence do I derive that if the thief is found and does not have what to pay, the owner of the stolen objects may not say to the watcher: "Come and swear to me that it did not enter your heart to sell them"? From "If the thief not be found," implying that if the thief were found, the watcher is not liable for anything (even if the thief does not have what to pay.)
"וְנִקְרַב בַּעַל הַבֵּית אֵל הָאֱלֹהִים". שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי, לִשְׁאֹל בְּאוּרִים וְתֻמִּים! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "אֲשֶׁר יַרְשִׁיעֻן אֱלֹהִים", לֹא אָמַרְתִּי אֶלָּא אֱלֹהִים שֶׁהֵם מַרְשִׁיעִין.*אֱלֹהִים שֶׁהֵם מַרְשִׁיעִין: דיינים.
"then the master of the house shall draw near": I might think, to inquire of the urim vetumim (on the breast-plate of the high-priest.) It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 8) "whom elohim incriminate." Elohim who incriminate (i.e., judges) are intended.
"וְנִקְרַב בַּעַל הַבֵּית אֵל הָאֱלֹהִים", בִּשְׁבוּעָה. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בִּשְׁבוּעָה, אוֹ בִשְׁבוּעָה וְשֶׁלֹּא בִשְׁבוּעָה? הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן: נֶאֱמַר כָּן שְׁלִיחוּת יָד, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן שְׁלִיחוּת יָד. מַה לְּהַלָּן שְׁבוּעָה, אַף כָּן שְׁבוּעָה; מַה לְּהַלָּן בְּיוֹ"ד הֵ"א, אַף כָּן בְּיוֹ"ד הֵ"א; מַה כָּן בְּבֵית דִּין, אַף לְהַלָּן בְּבֵית דִּין; מַה כָּן לְצָרְכוֹ, אַף לְהַלָּן לְצָרְכוֹ; מַה כָּן (שמות כב,ח) "עַל כָּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע", אַף לְהַלָּן "עַל כָּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע".
"then the master of the house (i.e., the watcher) shall draw near to the judges": For an oath. You say, for an oath. But, perhaps for an oath or not for an oath? It follows (that it is for an oath), viz.: "sending forth of the hand" is stated here, and it is stated elsewhere (viz. Ibid. 10). "Just as there, with an oath, so, here, with an oath. Just as there, with "Yod-Keh" (the Name of the L–rd), so, here, with "Yod-Keh." Just as here, in beth-din, so, there, in beth-din. Just as there, (he must swear that he did not use it for) his own need, so, here, for his own need. Just as there, (Ibid. 8) "For every matter of offense," so, here, "for every matter of offense."
"אִם לֹא שָׁלַח יָדוֹ בִּמְלֶאכֶת רֵעֵהוּ", לְצָרְכָהּ. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְצָרְכָהּ, אוֹ לְצָרְכָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא לְצָרְכָהּ? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "עַל כָּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע", שֶׁבֵּית שַׁמַּי מְחַיְּבִין עַל מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַלֵּב בִּשְׁלִיחוּת יד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כב,ח) "עַל כָּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע", וּבֵית הִלֵּל אֵין מְחַיְּבִין אֶלָּא מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁשָּׁלַח יָד, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר "אִם לֹא שָׁלַח יָדוֹ", לְצָרְכָהּ.
(Ibid. 7) "that he did not send his hand against his neighbor's deposit": for his need. You say, for his need. But perhaps for his need or not for his need (but for the animal's)? It is, therefore, (to negate this) written "For every matter of offense." Variantly: "For every matter of offense": (As per the difference between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel,) Beth Shammai saying: One is liable (even) for negative intent vis-à-vis "sending forth the hand." It being written "For every matter of offense," ("offense" subsuming negative intent). And Beth Hillel say: One is not liable until he actually sends forth his hand, this being the thrust of "that he did not send forth his hand."
(שמות כב,ח) ["עַל כָּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע, עַל שׁוֹר עַל חֲמוֹר עַל שֶׂה עַל שַׂלְמָה, עַל כָּל אֲבֵדָה אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר כִּי הוּא זֶה, עַד הָאֱלֹהִים יָבֹא דְּבַר שְׁנֵיהֶם, אֲשֶׁר יַרְשִׁיעֻן אֱלֹהִים יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנַיִם לְרֵעֵהוּ."] "עַל כָּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע", כְּלָל; "עַל שׁוֹר עַל חֲמוֹר עַל שֶׂה עַל שַׂלְמָה", פְּרָט; אוֹ כְּלָל וּפְרָט, אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט. וּכְשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר "עַל כָּל אֲבֵדָה", חָזַר וְכָלַל. אוֹ כָלַל כַּכְּלָל הָרִאשׁוֹן? אָמַרְתָּ, לָאו, אֶלָּא כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל, אֵי אַתְּ דָּן אֶלָּא כְעֵין הַפְּרָט: מַה הַפְּרָט מְפֹרָשׁ בִּנְכָסִים מִטַּלְטְלִין שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת, אַף אֵין לִי אֶלָּא נְכָסִים מִטַּלְטְלִין שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת.
"For every matter of offense" — general. "for an ox, for an ass, for a lamb, for a garment" — particular. General-particular (The rule is:) There is subsumed in the general only what obtains in the particular. "for every lost object about which he will say" — reversion to the general. But perhaps (the idea is) to revert to the original generalization? Would you say that? We have here an instance of general-particular-general, (where the rule is:) The general is understood to be of the nature of the particular, viz. (In this instance,) Just as the particular are explicitly only movable, non-mortgaged possessions, so, the general (must be of that nature).
בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר לְשׁוֹמֵר הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר לְשׁוֹמֵר הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אוֹ לֹא בָא אֶלָּא לַחְלֹק בֵּין כֶּסֶף לְכֵלִים לִבְהֵמָה? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "שַׂלְמָה": שַׂלְמָה, בַּכְּלָל הָיַת, וְיָצַאת לְלַמֵּד. אֶלָּא, מַה שַּׂלְמָה מְיֻחֶדֶת, בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר לְשׁוֹמֵר הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אַף כֹּל בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר לְשׁוֹמֵר הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. הָא לֹא בָא הַכָּתוּב לַחְלֹק בֵּין כֶּסֶף לְכֵלִים לִבְהֵמָה.
Variantly: "for an ox, for an ass": Why is this stated? Because it is written (earlier [6]) "If a man give to his neighbor money or vessels, etc." and (later 9]) "If a man give to his neighbor an ox or a lamb, etc.", Scripture comes here [8] to discriminate between (the first) watcher, (an unpaid watcher), and the second, (a paid watcher). But perhaps Scripture comes to differentiate between [6] "money or vessels" and [9] "beast"? It is, therefore, written [8] "for an ox, for an ass," (indicating that this is not its purpose, but, rather to discriminate between watcher and watcher.)
"אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר כִּי הוּא זֶה", שֶׁזֶּה אוֹמֵר 'זֶה הוּא', וְזֶה אוֹמֵר 'אֵינוֹ הוּא!' מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא הוֹדָיָה מִמִּין הַטַּעֲנָה.
"about which he will say that it is this": i.e., the first says, it is this, and the second, it is not (exactly) this — whence they ruled: (The oath is administered) only where there is admission to part of the claim.
(שמות כב,ז) "וְנִקְרַב בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אֶל הָאֱלֹהִים", הֲרֵי אֶחָד; (שמות כב,ח) "עַד הָאֱלֹהִים יָבֹא דְּבַר שְׁנֵיהֶם", הֲרֵי שְׁנַיִם; (שמות כב,ח) "אֲשֶׁר יַרְשִׁיעֻן אֱלֹהִים", הֲרֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה. מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.
(22:7) "then the master of the house shall draw near to elohim (judge) — one, (Ibid. 8) "until elohim shall come the matter of both" — two. (Ibid.) "Whom elohim shall incriminate" — three. From here they ruled: Monetary litigations are (judged) by three. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah.
רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹן, תְּחִלָּה נֶאֱמַר, וְאֵין דּוֹרְשִׁין תְּחִלּוֹת. "עַד הָאֱלֹהִים יָבֹא דְּבַר שְׁנֵיהֶם", הֲרֵי אֶחָד; "אֲשֶׁר יַרְשִׁיעֻן אֱלֹהִים", הֲרֵי שְׁנַיִם, וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין שָׁקוּל, מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד, הֲרֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה.
R. Yonathan says: The first was stated in the beginning, and "beginnings are not expounded." "until elohim shall come the matter of both" — one. "Whom elohim shall incriminate" — two. And "there is no evenly balanced beth-din," wherefore one is added to them — so that we have three.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: "עַד הָאֱלֹהִים יָבֹא דְּבַר שְׁנֵיהֶם", בִּשְׁנַיִם הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בִּשְׁנַיִם הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְאֶחָד? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר "אֲשֶׁר יַרְשִׁיעֻן אֱלֹהִים", הֲרֵי כָּן שְׁנַיִם: 'אֲשֶׁר יַרְשִׁיעַ' אֵין כָּתוּב כָּן, אֶלָּא "אֲשֶׁר יַרְשִׁיעֻן", הָא בִשְׁנַיִם הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין שָׁקוּל, מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶם עוֹד אֶחָד, הֲרֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה. מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה.
Rebbi says: "until elohim shall come the matter of both. Scripture speaks of two. You say this, but perhaps it speaks of one" — It is not written "Whom elohim shall incriminate ("yarshiyen," with a vav, [which would signify two]), but "yarshian," (without the vav, which signifies one), so that, (all together) Scripture speaks of two. And "there is no equally balanced beth-din," wherefore one is added to them — so that we have three. From here they ruled: Monetary litigations are (judged) by three.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בַּחֲמִשָּׁה, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה.
R. Meir says: by five, so that the case be decided by (a majority of) three.
"יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנַיִם לְרֵעֵהוּ." רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: קוֹרֵא אֲנִי עָלָיו כָּן "יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנַיִם לְרֵעֵהוּ", וְקוֹרֵא אֲנִי לְהַלָּן: (ויקרא ה,כד) "וְשִׁלַּם אֹתוֹ בְּרֹאשׁוֹ, וַחֲמִשִׁתָיו יֹסֵף עָלָיו". כֵּיצַד יִתְקַיְּמוּ שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין? כָּל הַמְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַקֶּרֶן, חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַחֹמֶשׁ, וְכָל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַקֶּרֶן, פָּטוּר מִן הַחֹמֶשׁ. "לְרֵעֵהוּ", וְלֹא לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ; "לְרֵעֵהוּ", וְלֹא לַאֲחֵרִים.
"he shall pay double to his neighbor": R. Shimon says: I read here "he shall pay double to his neighbor," and elsewhere, (Leviticus 5:24) "and he shall pay it (the principal) at its head (and its fifth shall he add to it)!" How are these two verses to be reconciled? One who pays (only) the principal must pay the fifth, and one who pays kefel is exempt from the fifth. "to his neighbor," and not to the Temple; "to his neighbor," and not to others (i.e., idolators).