רנא. קול תלונה ויללה על השמועה מי יוכל להחריש ולומר נואש ועל כל אח עקוב יעקב ב"ר משה אשר קידש בת יודא ע"י שליח ע"מ לכונסה במקומה ושכר לו מלמד כדלעיל והשיבו חמיו לארצו כדי שיבירא מכחישתו ועתה רוצה שיוליכנה הבת אליו והדרכי' משובשי' ויש לנדיב שם גדול ומשופע וירא לשלוח בתו מחמת גנבים ומחמת התנאי [מבקש] שיבא הבחור לחבר אהלו במקום שהיו הקידושי' או [יגרשנה] הדין עם הנדיב לכוף הבחור לעשות א' מב' דרכים וסייעת' מר"ת שכתב בתשו' א' שמתחלת אשה ואיש אשר ירא לעשות רצון הבורא מן הדין על כל ב"ד לכוף לכל מי שאינו רוצה ליבם או לחלוץ אם הוא גדול ואפי' ע"י גוים חובשי' אותו וא"ל עשה מה שישראל אומר לך ואומר ע"י ישראל רוצה אני משמע שכופי' לנדותו אם לא יעשה א' מן הב' דרכים אע"ג דמשמע דאין כופי' אלא היכא דמפרש כופי' כדמוכח בירושלמי פ' אלמנה ניזונות (ה"ז) תמן תנינן גט המעושה ביד ישראל כשר ובגוים [פסול] אמר שמואל אין מעשים אלא [לפסולות] ופריך מהמדיר את אשתו מליהנות לו ומשני אם שמענו שמוציא שמענו שכופי' משמע שאין כופי' אלא היכא שמפרש כופי' וזה כפיי' [גמורה מנידוי] לפי מה שהוקשו רבותינו בפ' החובל על מה שפי' רב אלפס אע"פ שאין גובי' דיני קנסות מ"מ מנדין אותו עד שיפייס לבעל דינו והקשו האי לנקטי' בכובסא עד דלשבקי' מ"מ אחר שיצא כפיי' מפי ר"ת מנדין אותו עד שיעשה א' מב' דרכים ואם רוח גאוה נשבה לאותו בחור למשוך חבלי שוא בעבותות שקר אין חקר לאשמתו ודורשי רשומות יעשו שלל נקמות וגזרנו על הבחור כל האלות החמורות והקלות עד שיעשה כדלעיל. והיכא דמפרש כופי' ר"ל בשוטי', ועוד משפט האיש דרכו לחזור על אבידתו ועוד דנוה הנדיב יפה ונוה הבחור רע כי [נדיב הוא ובתחלת התנאי הי' כן שידור בבית הנדיב] בשובה ונחת הלכה רווחת מנהג מבטל הלכה כל מקום שהלכה רופפת ראה היאך צבור נוהג בכל מקום לעשות החופה בבית אבי הכלה יעקב בה"ר יוסף נ"ע. אל אמרכליא וסגניא רבותינו שבאשכנז הנה אהבתכם הזקיקני לחות דעי על אודות הבחור כדלעיל מתוך התנאי [בשעת] הקידושי' אין עודג טענה למקדש ואפי' לר"ת [דבעי עמד וקדשו מיד זה הוי כפסיקת ממון] כמה אתה נותן לבנך כו' (כתו' ק"ב ע"ב) דשייך ביה קנין ולשם בעי' מיד לפר"ת אבל בעמידת המקום אחרי דיש עדים בתנאי לא צריך עמידה [מיד] ואף אם לא הי' עדים מסתמא לא טרח העשיר לקדש להחזיקו בביתו הוא ומלמד שלו אם לא הי' דעתו לעשות נישואי' בביתו ואף אם חזר [למקומו] ושב לאיתנו [יחזור] למקום שקידש כי איך יוכל לשלוח בתו וממונו בסכנה, שאשכנז [למקום] חירום דמי ואם נשא אשה ביהודה אינו יכול להוציאה [לגליל] ולאו דוקא נשא ה"ה אם קדשה אינו יכול להוצחיאה רק כשהיתה [עמו וכ"ש] שלא היתה [אגידה] ביה כל כך. ואפי' ביהודא ויהוד אנמי לכאורה אינו יכול להוציאה רק כשהיתה עמו וידעה מנהגו וכי ישאנה היום ויוליכנה למחר לארץ מרחק כ"ש זה כיהוד' וגליל דמי ואין להוציאה והנה אחרי שקידש האשה והגיע זמנה ולא נשא' והאשה תבעה להנשא יש לנו לומר לו או כנוס או פטור דהא אמרי' ביבמות [ס"ה ע"ב] כי באה בטענה בעינא חוטרא לידא ומרה לקבורה אלמא כי הני מילי כופי' ואע"ג דלא דמי כ"כ ויש לחלק מ"מ חזי' כשמונע מלעשות מאי דבעי כפי' ליה גם אמרו (כתו' ק"ט ע"א) הפוסק מעות לחתנו ופושט לו את הרגל אדמון אומר יכולה לומר לו או [כנוס] או פטור אלמא כפינן כי האי מלתא ואע"ג דאין מעשי' אלא לפסולות היינו דוקא עישוי גט לחודא אבל היכא דתלי' בדעתי לכנוס אין זה עישוי ואם רוצה לפטור יפטור ובה יש כח ביד חכמי' לעשות וגם בזה המעביר על דעת חכמי' לפי דברי רבותינו שיש למקדש במקום שקדשה או לכנוס או לפטור יש לכופו ברידוי ובנידוי כי יש לחוש לתקנת העיגון כי מצינו בכמה מקומות שחשו חכמי' לתקנת עגונות. ושלום לרבותינו שבאשכנז יחיאל בר' יעקב הלוי תנב"ה.
Wailing and complaint that cannot be silenced, arose because of Jacob b. Moses who betrothed the daughter of R. Judah…. The bridegroom may be coerced either to marry the bride on her terms or divorce her. R. Tam decided that a court must compel a levir to marry, or give halitzah to his brother's childless widow, even by the use of force; and that it is even permissible to have Gentiles use force on the levir until he comply with the decision of the Jewish court. Although according to the Jerusalem Talmud whenever the Mishna fails expressly to allow the use of coercion we can use no physical compulsion (Ket. 11, 7), and although the ban is a strong form of coercion, nevertheless, since R. Tam allowed the use of physical compulsion (in a case where the Mishna does not expressly allow the use of such measures, cf. B. Yeb. 39a) we ought to ban the bridegroom until he comply with our decision. Moreover, custom changes law; whenever we are uncertain regarding a certain law, we observe and follow the accepted practice. Thus, the custom is universally accepted of performing the marriage ceremony in the house of the bride's father. Therefore, we invoked against the youth all the curses great and small, until he comply with our decision. Signed Jacob b. Rabbi Joseph (Pr. 251). To our Rabbis of Germany, your love has obliged me to express my opinion regarding the above. Since witnesses testify to the fact that there was a stipulated condition at the time of the betrothal, such condition is binding and the bridegroom must live up to its terms. Even if there are no such witnesses, the fact that his father-in-law kept him in his house together with his teacher, even though he returned home because of illness, proves that the father-in-law intended that the wedding take place in his house. It is difficult to imagine that the latter intended to brave the grave danger of sending his daughter and his money to Germany, which is very unsafe country. Furthermore, a man may not force his wife to leave her country and to come to live in his country. Therefore, we may force the bridegroom to do one of two things: either marry his bride and come to live in her place of residence, or divorce her. The Rabbis ought to coerce him by the use of chastisement and the ban, for fear lest his bride remain a deserted wife. We find many instances where the Rabbis decreed special laws and took extraordinary measures in order to prevent the possibility of a woman remaining a deserted wife. Signed: Yehiel b. Jacob ha Levi (Pr. 251). To my teacher Rabbi Meir. I saw the decision of the judges in the case of the honorable R. Judah of Düren who betrothed his daughter to Jacob b. Moses of Rothenburg. At the time of the betrothal Moses agreed to send his son Jacob to Düren in order that he marry his bride there. Moses kept his agreement and sent his son to R. Judah. But, when the latter saw that Jacob was small in stature, homely, and despicable, he had pity on his daughter. Fearing lest she begin to despise her bridegroom, he sent Jacob back to his father to stay there till he grow up. When the bride grew up and R. Judah was told that Jacob also gained in strength, he sent for the latter to come and marry his bride. However, Moses refused to send Jacob to Düren. As time dragged on and R. Judah's daughter saw that her bridegroom refused to come to her, she sent a messenger to Rothenburg to demand that Jacob either marry her on the conditions previously agreed upon, or divorce her. But Jacob answered that he did not personally agree to move to Düren, that he did not join in his father's agreement on that score, that he would not come to her father's house, and that he would marry her only if she come to Rothenburg. Thereupon it was decided [by R. Meir] that she could not compel Jacob to move to Düren nor force him to divorce her. This decision, however, is very strange, and, in my opinion, is a perversion of justice for a number of reasons. a) Some of our great authorities quote the opinion of R. Tam to the effect that both the Mishna (Ket. 13, 10) and the Tosephta (Ket. 13, 2) which treat of the conditions under which a party to a marriage may be forced to remove to the place of residence of the other party, deal with forcing the husband to move to the place of residence of the wife. Therefore, the conclusion of both sources is that the husband who married a wife living in another country must move to that country. Again, whenever the talmudic sources state that the husband be so forced to move, the implication is that upon refusing to do so he must divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah. Next, it is well known that the bride's home is luxurious and comfortable [for which reason she ought not to be forced to remove to her husband's humble abode], that her traveling to Rothenburg would entail great difficulties and serious hazards since the entire road is infested with lurking dangers, and that her very stay in Rothenburg would be perilous because of her father's great reputation for wealth. Therefore, Jacob cannot force her to take such a step. Besides, even if she wanted to go to Rothenburg, her father's repeated objections would not allow her to do so, and she could do nothing about it. Therefore, this case is similar to the one quoted in the Mishna (Ket. 13, 5), in which case Admon decided that the bride might demand from her bridegroom that he either marry, or divorce her. Finally, Jacob is bound by his father's agreement, since it is customary for the parents of a couple to enter into all agreements governing the marriage, and for such agreements to be considered binding on the couple. Although the principle is accepted that "the consent of the father does not imply the consent of the son (Kid. 45b)", this principle applies only to the actual betrothal but not to the other arrangements appertaining thereto. Moreover, the fact that he came to live in Düren proves that he had agreed to his father's arrangement; while his having been sent home temporarily, because of illness, did not invalidate the original agreement. Therefore, it seems to me that the decision cited above was a perversion of justice, or, at least, against common sense, and not in the interest of the public welfare. For were we to accept the principle implied in your decision, the interests of the wealthy would suffer greatly. Thus many unscrupulous persons, knowing that the daughters of the rich cannot move away from their home towns, would betroth such women and then extort money from their fathers by refusing to marry them until either the women move away from their homeland, or their fathers pay exorbitant sums of money. And you, my teacher, R. Meir, how did you come to subscribe to such a decision? Everybody is wondering at this. For R. Judah is ready to fulfill all his previous promises and more; he wants Jacob and the bride also wants him. They are ready to give guarantees that they will not act treacherously against him; and, in case he does not want her, she is ready to accept her divorce and forego her ketubah. In the face of such facts, how can any Rabbi, student, or judge, give heed to those who insidiously demand that R. Judah's daughter come to live in Rothenburg, knowing full well that she can not do so! It is obvious that these persons are only interested in extorting money from R. Judah, and it is not becoming your dignity to uphold the cause of these extortionists. Should we allow an Israelite daughter to become a deserted wife because her father is averse to becoming a victim of extortion? I know that R. Judah did not acquiesce; that he could not bear the idea of being coerced and forced to part with his money; and that he sent inquiries to the elders, the greatest authorities of France, and to other places. It appears that those authorities have all agreed that Jacob ought to be forced to marry his bride on her own terms or to divorce her. Although you are the greatest authority of our generation, you will not find it easy to oppose the decision of our great authorities, lest dissensions multiply in Israel. "Therefore, leave off contention, before the quarrel break out" (Proverbs 17,14). Signed: Eliezer b. Ephraim. (Am. II, 81).
רנא. קול תלונה ויללה על השמועה מי יוכל להחריש ולומר נואש ועל כל אח עקוב יעקב ב"ר משה אשר קידש בת יודא ע"י שליח ע"מ לכונסה במקומה ושכר לו מלמד כדלעיל והשיבו חמיו לארצו כדי שיבירא מכחישתו ועתה רוצה שיוליכנה הבת אליו והדרכי' משובשי' ויש לנדיב שם גדול ומשופע וירא לשלוח בתו מחמת גנבים ומחמת התנאי [מבקש] שיבא הבחור לחבר אהלו במקום שהיו הקידושי' או [יגרשנה] הדין עם הנדיב לכוף הבחור לעשות א' מב' דרכים וסייעת' מר"ת שכתב בתשו' א' שמתחלת אשה ואיש אשר ירא לעשות רצון הבורא מן הדין על כל ב"ד לכוף לכל מי שאינו רוצה ליבם או לחלוץ אם הוא גדול ואפי' ע"י גוים חובשי' אותו וא"ל עשה מה שישראל אומר לך ואומר ע"י ישראל רוצה אני משמע שכופי' לנדותו אם לא יעשה א' מן הב' דרכים אע"ג דמשמע דאין כופי' אלא היכא דמפרש כופי' כדמוכח בירושלמי פ' אלמנה ניזונות (ה"ז) תמן תנינן גט המעושה ביד ישראל כשר ובגוים [פסול] אמר שמואל אין מעשים אלא [לפסולות] ופריך מהמדיר את אשתו מליהנות לו ומשני אם שמענו שמוציא שמענו שכופי' משמע שאין כופי' אלא היכא שמפרש כופי' וזה כפיי' [גמורה מנידוי] לפי מה שהוקשו רבותינו בפ' החובל על מה שפי' רב אלפס אע"פ שאין גובי' דיני קנסות מ"מ מנדין אותו עד שיפייס לבעל דינו והקשו האי לנקטי' בכובסא עד דלשבקי' מ"מ אחר שיצא כפיי' מפי ר"ת מנדין אותו עד שיעשה א' מב' דרכים ואם רוח גאוה נשבה לאותו בחור למשוך חבלי שוא בעבותות שקר אין חקר לאשמתו ודורשי רשומות יעשו שלל נקמות וגזרנו על הבחור כל האלות החמורות והקלות עד שיעשה כדלעיל. והיכא דמפרש כופי' ר"ל בשוטי', ועוד משפט האיש דרכו לחזור על אבידתו ועוד דנוה הנדיב יפה ונוה הבחור רע כי [נדיב הוא ובתחלת התנאי הי' כן שידור בבית הנדיב] בשובה ונחת הלכה רווחת מנהג מבטל הלכה כל מקום שהלכה רופפת ראה היאך צבור נוהג בכל מקום לעשות החופה בבית אבי הכלה יעקב בה"ר יוסף נ"ע. אל אמרכליא וסגניא רבותינו שבאשכנז הנה אהבתכם הזקיקני לחות דעי על אודות הבחור כדלעיל מתוך התנאי [בשעת] הקידושי' אין עודג טענה למקדש ואפי' לר"ת [דבעי עמד וקדשו מיד זה הוי כפסיקת ממון] כמה אתה נותן לבנך כו' (כתו' ק"ב ע"ב) דשייך ביה קנין ולשם בעי' מיד לפר"ת אבל בעמידת המקום אחרי דיש עדים בתנאי לא צריך עמידה [מיד] ואף אם לא הי' עדים מסתמא לא טרח העשיר לקדש להחזיקו בביתו הוא ומלמד שלו אם לא הי' דעתו לעשות נישואי' בביתו ואף אם חזר [למקומו] ושב לאיתנו [יחזור] למקום שקידש כי איך יוכל לשלוח בתו וממונו בסכנה, שאשכנז [למקום] חירום דמי ואם נשא אשה ביהודה אינו יכול להוציאה [לגליל] ולאו דוקא נשא ה"ה אם קדשה אינו יכול להוצחיאה רק כשהיתה [עמו וכ"ש] שלא היתה [אגידה] ביה כל כך. ואפי' ביהודא ויהוד אנמי לכאורה אינו יכול להוציאה רק כשהיתה עמו וידעה מנהגו וכי ישאנה היום ויוליכנה למחר לארץ מרחק כ"ש זה כיהוד' וגליל דמי ואין להוציאה והנה אחרי שקידש האשה והגיע זמנה ולא נשא' והאשה תבעה להנשא יש לנו לומר לו או כנוס או פטור דהא אמרי' ביבמות [ס"ה ע"ב] כי באה בטענה בעינא חוטרא לידא ומרה לקבורה אלמא כי הני מילי כופי' ואע"ג דלא דמי כ"כ ויש לחלק מ"מ חזי' כשמונע מלעשות מאי דבעי כפי' ליה גם אמרו (כתו' ק"ט ע"א) הפוסק מעות לחתנו ופושט לו את הרגל אדמון אומר יכולה לומר לו או [כנוס] או פטור אלמא כפינן כי האי מלתא ואע"ג דאין מעשי' אלא לפסולות היינו דוקא עישוי גט לחודא אבל היכא דתלי' בדעתי לכנוס אין זה עישוי ואם רוצה לפטור יפטור ובה יש כח ביד חכמי' לעשות וגם בזה המעביר על דעת חכמי' לפי דברי רבותינו שיש למקדש במקום שקדשה או לכנוס או לפטור יש לכופו ברידוי ובנידוי כי יש לחוש לתקנת העיגון כי מצינו בכמה מקומות שחשו חכמי' לתקנת עגונות. ושלום לרבותינו שבאשכנז יחיאל בר' יעקב הלוי תנב"ה.
Wailing and complaint that cannot be silenced, arose because of Jacob b. Moses who betrothed the daughter of R. Judah…. The bridegroom may be coerced either to marry the bride on her terms or divorce her. R. Tam decided that a court must compel a levir to marry, or give halitzah to his brother's childless widow, even by the use of force; and that it is even permissible to have Gentiles use force on the levir until he comply with the decision of the Jewish court. Although according to the Jerusalem Talmud whenever the Mishna fails expressly to allow the use of coercion we can use no physical compulsion (Ket. 11, 7), and although the ban is a strong form of coercion, nevertheless, since R. Tam allowed the use of physical compulsion (in a case where the Mishna does not expressly allow the use of such measures, cf. B. Yeb. 39a) we ought to ban the bridegroom until he comply with our decision. Moreover, custom changes law; whenever we are uncertain regarding a certain law, we observe and follow the accepted practice. Thus, the custom is universally accepted of performing the marriage ceremony in the house of the bride's father. Therefore, we invoked against the youth all the curses great and small, until he comply with our decision. Signed Jacob b. Rabbi Joseph (Pr. 251).
To our Rabbis of Germany, your love has obliged me to express my opinion regarding the above. Since witnesses testify to the fact that there was a stipulated condition at the time of the betrothal, such condition is binding and the bridegroom must live up to its terms. Even if there are no such witnesses, the fact that his father-in-law kept him in his house together with his teacher, even though he returned home because of illness, proves that the father-in-law intended that the wedding take place in his house. It is difficult to imagine that the latter intended to brave the grave danger of sending his daughter and his money to Germany, which is very unsafe country. Furthermore, a man may not force his wife to leave her country and to come to live in his country. Therefore, we may force the bridegroom to do one of two things: either marry his bride and come to live in her place of residence, or divorce her. The Rabbis ought to coerce him by the use of chastisement and the ban, for fear lest his bride remain a deserted wife. We find many instances where the Rabbis decreed special laws and took extraordinary measures in order to prevent the possibility of a woman remaining a deserted wife. Signed: Yehiel b. Jacob ha Levi (Pr. 251).
To my teacher Rabbi Meir. I saw the decision of the judges in the case of the honorable R. Judah of Düren who betrothed his daughter to Jacob b. Moses of Rothenburg. At the time of the betrothal Moses agreed to send his son Jacob to Düren in order that he marry his bride there. Moses kept his agreement and sent his son to R. Judah. But, when the latter saw that Jacob was small in stature, homely, and despicable, he had pity on his daughter. Fearing lest she begin to despise her bridegroom, he sent Jacob back to his father to stay there till he grow up. When the bride grew up and R. Judah was told that Jacob also gained in strength, he sent for the latter to come and marry his bride. However, Moses refused to send Jacob to Düren. As time dragged on and R. Judah's daughter saw that her bridegroom refused to come to her, she sent a messenger to Rothenburg to demand that Jacob either marry her on the conditions previously agreed upon, or divorce her. But Jacob answered that he did not personally agree to move to Düren, that he did not join in his father's agreement on that score, that he would not come to her father's house, and that he would marry her only if she come to Rothenburg. Thereupon it was decided [by R. Meir] that she could not compel Jacob to move to Düren nor force him to divorce her. This decision, however, is very strange, and, in my opinion, is a perversion of justice for a number of reasons. a) Some of our great authorities quote the opinion of R. Tam to the effect that both the Mishna (Ket. 13, 10) and the Tosephta (Ket. 13, 2) which treat of the conditions under which a party to a marriage may be forced to remove to the place of residence of the other party, deal with forcing the husband to move to the place of residence of the wife. Therefore, the conclusion of both sources is that the husband who married a wife living in another country must move to that country. Again, whenever the talmudic sources state that the husband be so forced to move, the implication is that upon refusing to do so he must divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah. Next, it is well known that the bride's home is luxurious and comfortable [for which reason she ought not to be forced to remove to her husband's humble abode], that her traveling to Rothenburg would entail great difficulties and serious hazards since the entire road is infested with lurking dangers, and that her very stay in Rothenburg would be perilous because of her father's great reputation for wealth. Therefore, Jacob cannot force her to take such a step. Besides, even if she wanted to go to Rothenburg, her father's repeated objections would not allow her to do so, and she could do nothing about it. Therefore, this case is similar to the one quoted in the Mishna (Ket. 13, 5), in which case Admon decided that the bride might demand from her bridegroom that he either marry, or divorce her. Finally, Jacob is bound by his father's agreement, since it is customary for the parents of a couple to enter into all agreements governing the marriage, and for such agreements to be considered binding on the couple. Although the principle is accepted that "the consent of the father does not imply the consent of the son (Kid. 45b)", this principle applies only to the actual betrothal but not to the other arrangements appertaining thereto. Moreover, the fact that he came to live in Düren proves that he had agreed to his father's arrangement; while his having been sent home temporarily, because of illness, did not invalidate the original agreement.
Therefore, it seems to me that the decision cited above was a perversion of justice, or, at least, against common sense, and not in the interest of the public welfare. For were we to accept the principle implied in your decision, the interests of the wealthy would suffer greatly. Thus many unscrupulous persons, knowing that the daughters of the rich cannot move away from their home towns, would betroth such women and then extort money from their fathers by refusing to marry them until either the women move away from their homeland, or their fathers pay exorbitant sums of money. And you, my teacher, R. Meir, how did you come to subscribe to such a decision? Everybody is wondering at this. For R. Judah is ready to fulfill all his previous promises and more; he wants Jacob and the bride also wants him. They are ready to give guarantees that they will not act treacherously against him; and, in case he does not want her, she is ready to accept her divorce and forego her ketubah. In the face of such facts, how can any Rabbi, student, or judge, give heed to those who insidiously demand that R. Judah's daughter come to live in Rothenburg, knowing full well that she can not do so! It is obvious that these persons are only interested in extorting money from R. Judah, and it is not becoming your dignity to uphold the cause of these extortionists. Should we allow an Israelite daughter to become a deserted wife because her father is averse to becoming a victim of extortion? I know that R. Judah did not acquiesce; that he could not bear the idea of being coerced and forced to part with his money; and that he sent inquiries to the elders, the greatest authorities of France, and to other places. It appears that those authorities have all agreed that Jacob ought to be forced to marry his bride on her own terms or to divorce her. Although you are the greatest authority of our generation, you will not find it easy to oppose the decision of our great authorities, lest dissensions multiply in Israel. "Therefore, leave off contention, before the quarrel break out" (Proverbs 17,14). Signed: Eliezer b. Ephraim. (Am. II, 81).