Just as we explained above (Part One, Principle VI, section 2) that according to the din it is forbidden to accept lashon hara, even if he spoke it to his face, so is it with rechiluth. That is, if one said to his face: "You said this and this about him," even if he remains silent now, when the rechiluth is spoken about him, it is still forbidden to accept it, and no proof is to be derived from this [his silence] that the thing is true. And even if it is the nature of that man not to remain silent in other matters, and he does so here, still, this is no proof of the truth of the matter, as we explained above.
And, all of this, even if the talebearer does not transgress, in what he says, "You shall not go talebearing among your people." As when he tells him to guard himself against Ploni, who wants to harm him, and the like, as we shall explain below. How much more so, if he speaks about him words of lashon hara and rechiluth in general. Have we not already explained above, in the name of the poskim that lashon hara and rechiluth are forbidden, whether in his presence or not? If so, even if all is true, as he says, that Ploni said this and this about him, still, he [the speaker] is an absolute evildoer, according to his tale itself; for he transgresses the negative commandment of "You shall not go talebearing among your people," and the other negative and positive commandments explained above in the introduction. And, if so, because of this evildoer, shall we remove this man [(the one spoken against)] from his status of kashruth and say that he transgressed the issur of lashon hara and the like? Certainly, one who is suspect of [transgressing] the negative commandment of rechiluth and lashon hara is also suspect of lying and adding words and changing things from beginning to end.
כְּשֵׁם שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ לְעֵיל בְּחֵלֶק א' בִּכְלָל ז' סָעִיף ב', דְּלָשׁוֹן הָרָע אָסוּר לְקַבֵּל מִן הדִּין, אֲפִלּוּ אִם סִפֵּר עָלָיו (ג) בְּפָנָיו, כֵּן הַדִּין בִּרְכִילוּת. דְּהַיְנוּ, שֶׁאָמַּר לוֹ בְּפָנָיו: אַתָּה דִּבַּרְתָּ עָלָיו כָּךְ וְכָךְ, וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם שׁוֹתֵק עַתָּה, בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁסִפֵּר עָלָיו הָרְכִילוּת בְּפָנָיו, גַּם כֵּן אָסוּר לְקַבֵּל, וְאֵין לִקַּח מִזֶּה שׁוּם רְאָיָה שֶׁהַדָּבָר אֱמֶת, וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם טִבְעוֹ שֶׁל זֶה הָאִישׁ, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁתֹּק בִּשְׁאָר דְּבָרִים, וּבָזֶה הוּא שׁוֹתֵק, אַף עַל פִּי כֵן אֵין זוֹ רְאָיָה לְהַחְלִיט שֶׁהַדָּבָר אֱמֶת, וּכְמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ הַכּל לְמַעְלָה, עַיֵּן שָׁם.
Just as we explained above (Part One, Principle VI, section 2) that according to the din it is forbidden to accept lashon hara, even if he spoke it to his face, so is it with rechiluth. That is, if one said to his face: "You said this and this about him," even if he remains silent now, when the rechiluth is spoken about him, it is still forbidden to accept it, and no proof is to be derived from this [his silence] that the thing is true. And even if it is the nature of that man not to remain silent in other matters, and he does so here, still, this is no proof of the truth of the matter, as we explained above.
וְכָל זֶה (ד) אֲפִלּוּ אִם הַמְרַגֵּל אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר לִדְבָרָיו עַל לָאו דְּלֹא תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּיךָ, כְּגוֹן, שֶׁמְסַפֵּר לוֹ, שֶׁיִּשְׁמֹר עַצְּמוֹ מִפְּלוֹנִי, שֶׁרוֹצֶה לְהַזִּיקוֹ וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵּא בָּזֶה, וּכְמוֹ שֶׁנְּבָאֵר לְקַמָּן, וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן אִם מְסַפֵּר עָלָיו דִּבְרֵי לָשׁוֹן הָרָע וּרְכִילוּת בְּעָלְמָא, הֲלֹא כְּבָר בֵּררְנוּ לְעֵיל בְּשֵׁם הַפּוֹסְקִּים, דְּלָשׁוֹן הָרָע וּרְכִילוּת אָסוּר, בֵּין בְּפָנָיו וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו, וַאֲפִלּוּ עַל דְּבַר אֱמֶת, וְאִם כֵּן אֲפִלּוּ אִם הַכֹּל אֱמֶת כִּדְבָרָיו, שֶׁדִּבֵּר עָלָיו פְּלוֹנִי כָּךְ וְכָךְ, אַף עַל פִּי כֵן הוּא רָשָׁע גָּמוּר לְפִי סִפּוּרוֹ בְּעַצְמוֹ, שֶׁעָבַר עַל לָאו דְּלֹא תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּךָ, וְלֹא תִשָּׂא שֵׁמַע שָׁוְא וּשְׁאָר לָאוִין וַעֲשִׂין הַמְבֹאָרִין לְעֵיל בַּפְּתִיחָה, וְאִם כֵּן, מִפְּנֵי רָשָׁע זֶה נוֹצִּיא לְאִידָךְ מֵחֶזְקַת כַּשְׁרוּתוֹ וְלוֹמַר, שֶׁעָבַר עַל אִסוּר לָשׁוֹן הָרָע וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה? בְּוַדַּאי הֶחָשׁוּד עַל לָאו דִּרְכִילוּת וְלָשׁוֹן הָרָע, חָשׁוּד גַּם כֵּן לְשַׁקֵּר וּלְהוֹסִיף דְּבָרִים וּלְהַחְלִיף מִסוֹפוֹ לִתְחִלָּתוֹ.
And, all of this, even if the talebearer does not transgress, in what he says, "You shall not go talebearing among your people." As when he tells him to guard himself against Ploni, who wants to harm him, and the like, as we shall explain below. How much more so, if he speaks about him words of lashon hara and rechiluth in general. Have we not already explained above, in the name of the poskim that lashon hara and rechiluth are forbidden, whether in his presence or not? If so, even if all is true, as he says, that Ploni said this and this about him, still, he [the speaker] is an absolute evildoer, according to his tale itself; for he transgresses the negative commandment of "You shall not go talebearing among your people," and the other negative and positive commandments explained above in the introduction. And, if so, because of this evildoer, shall we remove this man [(the one spoken against)] from his status of kashruth and say that he transgressed the issur of lashon hara and the like? Certainly, one who is suspect of [transgressing] the negative commandment of rechiluth and lashon hara is also suspect of lying and adding words and changing things from beginning to end.