And now, according to what we have explained, with the help of the Blessed L–rd, of the principles of apei telata, [we realize that] care must be taken that when the seven city dignitaries preside over the actions of the men of the city in matters of assessments and the like, where their judgment will be to the detriment of one and to the benefit of another, and they differ in opinion and decide according to the majority — when they leave the communal chamber, each one must take great heed not to relate thereafter his opinion or the opinion of Ploni to the effect that in the beginning of the case his opinion was to be lenient with the man involved, but his colleagues overruled him and compelled him to accept their view. And it goes without saying that if they agreed among themselves from the beginning that when they left the communal chamber they would not reveal or relate their deliberations to the man involved in the debt — [it goes without saying] that if he did so, this would be an absolute issur; but even if quite casually, without even intending to reveal anything, he happened to tell this to another in such a manner as to make it appear from his words that he did not incline to this [the majority opinion] even now, but that he could not contest it with the others, this, too, is an absolute issur. (And according to the opinion of Hayad Haketanah (Hilchoth Deoth 9) even if one relates casually that it was his opinion in the beginning to be lenient with the man involved, but it came to a vote and they decided according to the majority, this, too, is forbidden.) And there is no difference between whether one reveals this of his own volition or his friend rises against him with insults over this decision which they arrived at in a certain matter. In all instances it is forbidden to place the onus on his colleague and remove it from himself, even if what he says is true.
וְהִנִּה לְפִי מַה שֶּׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בְּעֶזְרַת ה' יִתְבָּרַךְ הַכְּלָלִים דְּאַפֵּי תְּלָתָא, צָּרִיךְ לִזָּהֵר, כְּשֶׁיּוֹשְׁבִין שִׁבְעָה טוֹבֵי הָעִיר לְעַיֵּן בִּדְבַר הַנְהָגַת אַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר בְּעִנְיְנִי הָעֲרָכוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵּא בָּזֶה, בְּדָבָר שֶׁהוּא חוֹב לָזֶה וּזְכוּת לָזֶה, וְנְחְלְקוּ בְּדֵעוֹת וְעָמְדוּ לְמִנְיָן וְהָלְכוּ בָּתַר רֻבָּא {אחר הרוב}, כְּשֶׁיֵּצְּאוּ מֵחֲדַר הַקָּהָל, (כא) צְּרִיכִין לִזָּהֵר מְאֹד כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד, שֶׁלֹּא לְסַפֵּר אַחַר כָּךְ דַּעְתּוֹ אוֹ דַּעַת פְּלוֹנִי, שֶׁהָיָה מִתְּחִלָּה בְּעִנְיָן זֶה לְהָקֵל עַל אוֹתוֹ פְּלוֹנִי, אַךְ חֲבֵרָיו רַבּוּ עָלָיו וְהִכְרִיחוּהוּ לֵילֵךְ בָּתַר דַּעְתָּם. וְלָא מִבָּעֵי {וא"צ לומר} אִם הֻסְכַּם בֵּינֵיהֶם מִתְּחִלָּה, כְּשֶׁיֵּצְּאוּ מֵחֲדַר הַקָּהָל שֶׁלֹּא לְגַלּוֹת אוֹ (כב) לְסַפֵּר לָאִישׁ הַנּוֹכְחִי גּוּפָא, שֶׁאֵלָיו נוֹגֵעַ הַחוֹב הַהוּא, בְּוַדַּאי אִסוּר גָּמוּר הוּא, אֶלָּא אֲפִלּוּ בִּסְתָמָא, וְגַם אֵינֶנּוּ מְכַוֵּן לְגַלּוֹת, (כג) רק בְּמִקְרֶה לְסַפֵּר לְאַחֵר בְּלָשׁוֹן שֶׁיֵּרָאֶה מִדְּבָרָיו, שֶׁדַּעְתּוֹ אֵינֶנּוּ נוֹטָה לָזֶה גַּם עַתָּה, אַךְ שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לָרִיב עֲבוּר זֶה עִם חֲבֵרָיו הַנִּשְׁאָרִים, גַּם כֵּן אִסוּר גָּמוּר הוּא, (וּלְפִי (כד) דַּעַת הַיָּד הַקְּטַנָּה, אֲפִלּוּ אִם יְסַפֵּר סְתָם, אֵיךְ שֶׁדַּעְתּוֹ הָיָה מִתְּחִלָּה לְהָקֵל עַל אוֹתוֹ פְּלוֹנִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ עָמְדוּ לְמִנְיָן וְהָלְכוּ בָּתַר רֻבָּא, גַּם כֵּן אָסוּר), וְאֵין שׁוּם נָפְקָא מִנַּה {הבדל} בֵּין לַמְסַפֵּר דָּבָר זֶה מֵעַצְּמּוֹ, וּבֵין אִם עָמַד עָלָיו חֲבֵרוֹ בְּחֵרוּפִין עַל דְּבַר זֶה הַפְּסָק שֶׁיָּצָא מֵאִתָּם עַל דְּבַר פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי, בְּכָל גַּוְנֵי {בכל האפנים} אָסוּר לְהַטִּיל אֶת הָעוְלָה עַל חְבֵרוֹ וּלְסַלְּקָה מֵעָלָיו, אַף שֶׁהוּא אֱמֶת.
And now, according to what we have explained, with the help of the Blessed L–rd, of the principles of apei telata, [we realize that] care must be taken that when the seven city dignitaries preside over the actions of the men of the city in matters of assessments and the like, where their judgment will be to the detriment of one and to the benefit of another, and they differ in opinion and decide according to the majority — when they leave the communal chamber, each one must take great heed not to relate thereafter his opinion or the opinion of Ploni to the effect that in the beginning of the case his opinion was to be lenient with the man involved, but his colleagues overruled him and compelled him to accept their view. And it goes without saying that if they agreed among themselves from the beginning that when they left the communal chamber they would not reveal or relate their deliberations to the man involved in the debt — [it goes without saying] that if he did so, this would be an absolute issur; but even if quite casually, without even intending to reveal anything, he happened to tell this to another in such a manner as to make it appear from his words that he did not incline to this [the majority opinion] even now, but that he could not contest it with the others, this, too, is an absolute issur. (And according to the opinion of Hayad Haketanah (Hilchoth Deoth 9) even if one relates casually that it was his opinion in the beginning to be lenient with the man involved, but it came to a vote and they decided according to the majority, this, too, is forbidden.) And there is no difference between whether one reveals this of his own volition or his friend rises against him with insults over this decision which they arrived at in a certain matter. In all instances it is forbidden to place the onus on his colleague and remove it from himself, even if what he says is true.